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Summary
A variety of manufacturing sectors are subject to unreliable supplies, which ranges
from chemical, assembly and electronic fabrication, etc. In many cases, the un-
certainty of supply process is unlikely controllable. Hence, to mitigate supply
risks, the optimal determination of pricing and financing policies is of particular
importance. Motivated by some practical problems with unreliable supplies, this
thesis aims at developing and evaluating different pricing and financing policies
under different business environments.
This thesis consists of two parts of studies. In the first part, we look at the pric-
ing strategies of a remanufacturing system with random yield. A special feature
of remanufacturing business is the large proportion of replacement customers.
This is due to the fact that, for many durable product markets, customers who
return their end-of-life products need to do replacement purchase. At the same
time, pricing strategies have been widely adopted by remanufacturing compa-
nies to balance supply and demand. In this study, the joint decision of acquisition,
trade-in and selling price is considered. The objective is to maximize the expected
profit of the remanufacturing firm. Our results show that a price discrimination
policy improves remanufacturer’s profit when the replacement customers have
high return quality and high price sensitivity. In addition, it is shown that the
profitability of quality dependent rebate policy varies significantly with respect
to replacement customers’ actual reaction to the prices.
The second part of this thesis considers the financing problem in a two ech-
elon supply chain. Motivated by the practical problem faced by many supply
chains, we analyze the impact of supplier’s limited working capital and uncertain
production yield. We establish conditions under which the supplier is willing to
fulfill retailer’s order either using initial budget or through bank loan financing.
It is shown that when the wholesale price and the expected production yield
are low while the financing cost is high, the retailer has incentives to offer fi-
nancial support to the supplier. To keep supplier’s interest aligned, the retailer
may need to provide financial support and increase the order size simultaneously.
vii
We further extend the model to the case with voluntary compliance and obtain
structural properties of retailer’s optimal decisions.
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In recent years, there has been an increasing concern on closed loop supply
chains. Due to economic incentives, environmental concerns and legislation reg-
ulations, more and more companies are involving in product recovery business.
Remanufacturing is one of the various product recovery options. By repairing or
replacing old components, remanufacturing brings used products to the same-
as-new conditions. Comparing with manufacturing, remanufacuring reduces the
wastes produced and the raw materials needed. Therefore it is both environmen-
tal friendly and economically beneficial. Successful practices of remanufacturing
can be found in industries like automotive, construction, mining and aerospace,
etc.
A special feature of remanufacturing business is the correlation between
supply and demand. This phenomena is due to the existence of replacement cus-
tomers. As reported by Lund and Hauser (2010), many remanufactured products
are used for replacement. Possible explanations for this phenomena includes: (i)
Customer wants to avoid the switching cost of changing to a different products.
(ii) In many cases, remanufactured product requires lower prices than brand new
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ones. (iii) Environmentally conscious customer tends to choose remanufactured
product.
Another characteristic of remanufacturing business is the uncertain quality
of return products. Unlike the manufacturing process which can be controlled
and monitored effectively, in remanufacturing business, the return products come
from customers and are of various quality conditions. The actual return quality
can only be observed after inspection. This business nature challenges firm’s
decision making process in matching supply and demand.
This study is motivated by these special characteristics of remanufacturing
practice. We consider a remanufacturing system with the existence of replace-
ment customer segment and uncertain return yield. As pricing strategies have
been widely adopted by remanufacturing companies, in this study, the joint deci-
sion of acquisition, trade-in and selling prices is considered. The remanufacturing
company acquires used products from previous customers through acquisition
programs. The supply of return flow is price dependent. Demand comes from
both replacement customer and first time buyer which is also price dependent.
Replacement customers can return their old products and get trade-in rebates
for new purchases. The demand can be satisfied either by remanufacturing used
products or manufacturing new ones.
As the quality of return flow is highly variable. The quality condition may
differ among different return flows. Zikopoulos and Tagaras (2007) investigate
a reverse supply chain with two collection sites which are of different return
qualities. They derive the condition under which it is optimal to use only one
site. In our study, the acquisition return comes from end-of-use product, which
means the costumer no longer needs such product. On the other hand, the
replacement return occurs only when a product fails or exceeds the useful life.
Due to the difference in return causation, a reasonable conjecture would be that
the acquisition return and the replacement return may have different quality
conditions. We also investigate how firm’s profitability is affected by the quality
difference of return products.
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This model represents the remnaufacturing practice of many durable prod-
ucts. For highly saturated markets, a significant portion of purchase could be re-
placement. A practical example can be found in Caterpillar, which is the world’s
largest manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural
gas engine. Customers who return their end-of-life products can get a cash back
from Caterpillar. The company also offers trade-in rebates to those replacement
customers.
The objective of this study is to investigate the optimal pricing policies with
random yield and the existence of replacement customer. The rest of this study
is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we review relevant literature. In Section
1.3, we present the model in detail and characterize the optimal pricing policies.
Numerical study is provided in Section 1.4. Finally, conclusions and future
research directions are discussed in Section 1.5.
1.2 Literature Review
This study is mainly related to three streams of research: consumers’ replacement
decisions, return acquisition in remanufacturing , and systems with random yield.
Some studies in remanufacturing have assumed that supply and demand
are independent. However, a notable feature of remanufacturing business is
the correlation between returns and sales. For durable products like engines
or transmissions, many customers need to do replacement after their in-using
products reach the end of service life. Consumers’ replacement or repurchase
behaviour has been widely discussed in the area of marketing research. Cus-
tomers’ replacement decisions are not only dependent on their own attitudes
and perceptions (Bayus, 1991), but also affected by company’s advertisements
and product developments (Winer, 1997). Novemsky and Kahneman (2005)
suggest that marketers can mitigate consumers’ loss aversion by accepting
the old product as a trade-in. Unlike these studies which focus on descriptive
and empirical analysis of consumers’ replacement behaviour, in this paper, it is
assumed that the remanufacturing company can use trade in rebates as a pricing
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tool to differentiate replacement customers and first time buyers. We focus on
the optimal pricing strategies under different yield conditions.
Due to the increasing concern on closed-loop supply chain, there is an exten-
sive literature on remanufacturing, reverse logistics and other related problems.
Fleischmann et al. (1997) provide a detailed review of quantitative models for
reverse logistics. Guide and Van Wassenhove (2003) provide a thorough review
on the business aspects of closed-loop supply chains. For more recent reviews,
we refer to Souza (2008), and Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009).
One of the important issues in closed loop supply chain is the product ac-
quisition management, which has been widely discussed in both practice and
academia. To stimulate product return, firms can either facilitate the reverse
channel or provide monetary incentives to existing customers. In an early work,
Guide and Jayaraman (2000) establish the framework for product acquisition
management. Savaskan et al. (2004) use game theory models to study the effi-
ciency of different reverse channels in a supply chain setting.
Guide et al. (2003) consider a remanufacturing planning problem in which
returns can have different quality levels. They assume that the return supply
from each quality class and the product demand are both price dependent. A
single period framework is developed to determine the optimal pricing policy.
Recently, Zhou and Yu (2011) study the joint acquisition, pricing and inventory
management problem in a multiperiod setting. However, both papers ignore the
fact that higher acquisition price may lead to higher demand due to the existence
of replacement customers. Despite the extensive discussion of product acquisition
management, few studies investigate the effect of replacement purchase on
remanufacturing business. Debo et al. (2006) consider an infinite-horizon model
in which previous customers can make repeated purchase in future periods.
Atasu et al. (2008) study the joint pricing problem of new and remanufactured
products with green segment customers. They assume that returns from previous
sales can affect future demand, but they take return quantity as a fixed fraction
of previous sales and do not consider the acquisition management. In an closely
related work to ours, Ray et al. (2005) assume firms can influence customers’
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return and repurchase decisions by offering different rebates and prices. How-
ever, instead of considering return products as supply for future production, they
model return revenue as a deterministic function of product remaining lifespan.
This study is also related to the research stream on systems with random
yields. Yano and Lee (1995) provide a comprehensive review of this problem up
to mid-1990s. More recent work includes Hsu and Bassok (1999), Bollapragada
and Morton (1999), Li and Zheng (2006), Inderfurth and Transchel (2007), and
Tang et al. (2012). In remanufacturing planning, there are several works consider
the effect of uncertain yield. Ferrer (2003) firstly analyzes inventory system with
deterministic demand and random yield. Zikopoulos and Tagaras (2007) study
a remanufacturing system where return supply comes from two collection sites,
both with uncertain yield rates. It is shown that in some situations, it is optimal
to collect from only one site. Bakal and Akcali (2006) develop a single period
model to determine the optimal acquisition and selling price. Mukhopadhyay
and Ma (2009) study the joint procurement and production problem of a hybrid
system with both demand and return yield rate are random. Zhou et al. (2011)
adopt a different approach where return flows can have different quality levels
but the remanufacturing process are perfectly reliable.
This work differs from the existing studies in that we model replacement
customers as an independent customer segment. Unlike those models which take
repeated purchase as an uncontrollable process, we assume replacement demand
can be actively controlled by firm’s pricing decisions. Our work contributes to the
literature by taking consideration of replacement customers which affects both
the supply and the demand in remanufacturing business.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Assumption
In this analysis, a single period remanufacturing business model is considered.













Figure 1.1: Problem enviroment
and sells remanufactured products to both new and replacement customers. It
is assumed the market is monopolistic and the company has pricing power. Fur-
thermore, to make the price discrimination policy possible, it is required to as-
sume that there is no efficient secondary market. For new customers who are
first time buyers, their demand is modeled as a linear function of selling price p,
ω(p) = a−bp, where a, b > 0. Replacement customers are current users who need
to replace their end-of-life products. Their repurchasing decisions also depend
on prices. Since end-of-life product can be used for remanufacturing, companies
usually offer trade-in rebates for those replacement purchase. Therefore, the de-
mand of replacement customers is considered as a linear function of repurchasing
price f , θ(f) = δ − γf , where δ, γ > 0. The difference between p and f is the
trade-in rebates offered to the replacement customers. There is also a return
flow from end-of-use products by existing users. It is assumed that the end-of-use
return depends on the acquisition price r, and can be modeled as η(r) = α+ βr,
where α, β > 0. For simplicity, η, ω and θ are used to represent the corresponding
functions. Figure 1.1 illustrates the material flow of such a hybrid system.
After return products are acquired(both through trade-in and acquisition),
they are disassembled to check whether they can be remanufactured. The inspec-
tion cost is denoted as d. Since acquisition return and replacement return are
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from different customer segments, the yield rate of return products can either
be identical or different. The case when yield conditions are identical is firstly
considered. The aggregate yield rate is denoted by ρ, which is a random vari-
able observed only after inspection. In this case, the remanufacturing quantity is
min{ω + θ, ρ(θ + η)}, with unit remanufacturing cost cr. Worn out returns and
excess reusable returns are disposed with zero disposition cost. When reusable
return is insufficient to satisfy demand, the company needs to manufacture new
products at unit cost c, where c > cr. Later, we also consider the case when acqui-
sition return and replacement return are of different yield conditions. Throughout
this study, it is assumed that the demand is deterministic. As mentioned in the
introduction, many remanufacturing businesses are for durable products which
are highly saturated. The demand could be relatively stable and predictable with
few suppliers and customers on the market. For example, the service life of exist-
ing equipments can be calculated by the working schedule. Therefore, it would
be reasonable to assume a deterministic demand function. Whereas, the deter-
ministic demand assumption wouldn’t hold for many consumer markets. On the
other hand, the re-usability of return flows can only be observed after complete
disassemble and inspection. Hence, the return yield is considered as random.
1.3.2 Identical Yield Rate
Given the model described above, in this section, we formulate the pricing prob-
lem when the yield rate is identical between acquisition return and replacement
return. Firstly the case with deterministic yield is considered, which means the
percentage of remanufacturable return is fixed and known. We then relax this
assumption to incorporate random yield condition. The optimal decisions are
characterized for both cases.
Deterministic Yield Rate
It is assumed that the remanufacturing firm always recognizes that there exists
replacement customer segment. When the firm decides not to offer trade in
programs, both replacement and new customers will buy the product at retail
price p. Meanwhile, replacement and acquisition customers will sell their old
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products to the firm at price r. In such case, the demand function of replacement
customers can be characterized as: θ(p, r) = δ − γ(p− r). The company decides
p and r simultaneously to maximize the profit. Such a pricing strategy is named
as uniform pricing. This pricing strategy represents the case when product sales
and return collection are lack of coordination. For example, the reverse channel
is outsourced to a third party collector. It is not the main focus of this study, but
serves as a benchmark for the price discrimination strategy. For more details of
such a uniform pricing, readers can refer to Ray et al. (2005) and Savaskan et al.
(2004). The pricing problem can be formulated as follows:
Max
r,p
Πu(r, p) = ω(p)p+ θ(p, r)(p− r − d)− η(r)(r + d)− crρ(η(r) + θ(p, r))
−c(ω(p) + θ(p, r)− ρ(θ(p, r) + η(r)))+ (1.1)
subject to r, p, η(r), θ(p, r), ω(p) ≥ 0
Since the company can choose whether to manufacture or not, two differ-
ent scenarios are obtained. First, if the remanufacturable return is less than the
total demand, ω + θ > ρ(η + θ), part of the demand needs to be satisfied by
manufacturing. The profit equals to sales revenue minus acquisition, inspection,
remanufacturing and manufacturing cost. Second, if demand can be fully satis-
fied by remanufacturing, i.e. ω + θ ≤ ρ(η + θ), there is no need to manufacture.
It should be noticed that since acquiring returns incurs additional cost(both ac-
quisition cost and inspection cost), in practice, when ω + θ > ρ(η + θ), the firm
can always improve the profit by reducing the acquisition price r.
The objective function Πu(r, p) is concave as it is a quadratic function
with respect to decision variables without intersections and the second order
derivatives are all negative, and the constraints are linear. Hence, there exists
(r∗u, p∗u) which solves the first order condition.
When the firm decides to offer trade-in rebates to replacement customers,
the selling price p is charged to new customers, f is charged to replacement cus-
tomers and each acquisition return is paid at r. Additionally, the company should
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assure p− f ≥ r to make the trade-in rebate attractive to replacement customers.
Otherwise, replacement customers should sell their end-of-use products at the
acquisition market, and buy the new products at price p. The trade-in program
becomes ineffective. The pricing problem is formulated as follows:
Max
r,f,p
Π(r, f, p) = ω(p)p+ θ(f)(f − d)− η(r)(r + d)− crρ(η(r) + θ(f))
−c(ω(p) + θ(f)− ρ(θ(f) + η(r)))+ (1.2)
subject to r + f ≤ p (1.3)
Constraint 1.3 makes sure that trade-in rebate is no less than the acquisition
price. When Constraint 1.3 is binding, the above problem becomes equivalent
to the uniform pricing problem. We first solve the relaxation problem without
considering constraint 1.3. After that, we identify the condition under which the
pricing policy would violate this constraint.
Lemma 1.1. Without considering Constraint 1.3, the optimal pricing policy under
deterministic return yield rate is:
(r∗, f∗, p∗) = (−α+dβ2β + 12(c− cr)ρ, cγ+dγ+δ2γ − 12(c− cr)ρ, a+bc2b )
which solves the first order condition.
As η(r), θ(f) and ω(p) are linear functions, it can be verified that Π(r, f, p) is
concave in r, f , and p. Lemma 1.1 indicates the optimal pricing decisions to the
unconstrained problem. We then establish the conditions under which Constraint
1.3 is binding.








Proof: By checking the optimal solution in Lemma 1.1, we can find the condition
when the second constraint is binding.
According to Proposition 1.1, the price discrimination policy is preferable
only when δγ − ab − αβ < 0. Since γ, b and β represent the price sensitivity of
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each customer segments, the result suggests that a higher rebate to replace-
ment customers benefits the remanufacturer when this segment has high price
sensitivity and the new customers and acquisition customers are of low price
sensitivity. An interesting question is that given δγ − ab − αβ < 0, what is the
profit improvement of price discrimination. Define value of price discrimination
as Π(r∗, f∗, p∗) − ΠU (r∗u, p∗u), Corollary 1.1 gives the result under deterministic
yield rate.
Corollary 1.1. Given δγ − ab − αβ < 0, the value of price discrimination is :
(bαγ + aβγ − bβδ)2
4bβγ(βγ + b(β + γ))
.
Corollary 1.1 can be easily proved by substituting (r∗, f∗, p∗) and (r∗u, p∗u)
into the corresponding profit functions. This result shows that the value of price
discrimination is independent of unit manufacturing cost c, unit remanufactur-
ing cost cr and yield rate ρ. In addition, it can be verified that for both pricing
strategies the demand and return volume are the same. As a result, the manufac-
turing cost and remanufacturing cost are unchanged. This explains why the profit
difference is independent of c, cr and ρ. We can conclude that the benefits of
price discrimination comes from better targeting at different customer segments,
instead of cost savings from production process.
Random Yield Rate
When the return yield is random, depending on the pricing decisions and the
realization of yield rate, the firm’s profit has two expressions:
pi =

ωp+ θf − ηr − d(θ + η)− cr(ω + θ), when ω + θ ≤ ρ(θ + η)
ωp+ θf − ηr − d(θ + η)− c(ω + θ) otherwise
+ρ(c− cr)(θ + η),
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The expected profit function with random yield rate is expressed as:
E[Π(r, f, p)] = ωp+ θ(f − d)− η(r + d)− crE[min{ω + θ, ρ(η + θ)}]
−cE[((ω + θ)− ρ(η + θ))+]
= ω(p− cr) + θ(f − cr − d)− η(r + d)
−(c− cr)E[(ω + θ − ρ(θ + η))+]
The yield rate ρ is randomly distributed on [A,B] (0 ≤ A < B ≤ 1), with
CDF G(·), PDF g(·), and mean value µ. The relation between return and sales
has two different cases which are affected by the pricing decisions:
Case 1:(θ + η)A ≤ θ + ω ≤ (θ + η)B





(θ + ω − ρ(θ + η)) g(ρ)dρ
Case 2:(θ + η)B ≤ θ + ω
E[Π(r, f, p)] = ωp+ θ(f − d)− η(r + d) + µ(c− cr)(θ + η)− c(ω + θ)
Note that the case (θ + η)A > θ + ω is omitted here. In practice, when
reusable return is greater than the total demand, the company can always reduce
the acquisition price to increase the profit.
For Case 2, the maximum possible reusable return is less than the total de-
mand for any yield realization. Hence, manufacturing is always needed. The
optimization problem is similar to the situation of deterministic yield rate, and
the optimal decision only depends on the mean value of yield rate.
For Case 1, the expected profit function is similar to that of a classical
newsvendor problem with price dependent demand. Except that classic newsven-
dor model usually assumes random demand and perfectly reliable supply, while
in this remanufacturing problem, we consider deterministic demand and uncer-
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tain yield rate.
Lemma 1.2. E[Π(r, f, p)] is differentiable.
Proposition 1.2. The expected profit function is jointly concave in r, f, and p.
Lemma 1.2 and Proposition 1.2 indicate that an optimal pricing decision
exists and can be found by solving the first order condition.
Corollary 1.2. Given two different yield conditions ρ1 and ρ2 which dis-
tributed on [A,B] with ρ1 ≤st ρ2, remanufacturer’s optimal expected profit
E[Π∗(ρ1)] ≤ E[Π∗(ρ2)].
Corollary 1.2 shows that the remanufacturer is always better off when the
return yield is stochastically larger.
The optimal pricing decision for the uniform pricing problem can be found
by adding a linear constrain r + f = p to the above problem. Since the concavity
of the expected profit function has been proved, the optimal uniform pricing
decision (r∗u p∗u) can be obtained similarly. By definition, it is indisputable that
E[Π(r∗, f∗, p∗)] ≥ E[Π(r∗u, p∗u)]. However, because of the complexity of the prob-
lem, a closed form solution is not obtainable. An interesting question is that
whether Corollary 1.1 still holds for the random yield rate problem, we present
numerical results in Section 1.4.
1.3.3 Different Yield Rates of Returns
In this subsection, the assumption of identical yield rate are relaxed. We investi-
gate how firm’s profitability is affected by the quality difference of return prod-
ucts. Let ρ1 and ρ2 denote the yield rate of acquisition return and replacement
return respectively. When remanufacutring company adopts price discrimination
policy, it is possible that acquisition returns would have higher yield rate but
receive lower rebates. It is assumed this would not change the supply function
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of acquisition returns. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, since the actual yield
condition realizes only after inspection, customers cannot get this information in
advance. Secondly, the higher rebates to the replacement customers are used to
encourage repurchase, and pure return customers should not take this benefit.
The remanufacturer’s expected profit function is expressed as:
E[Π(r, f, p)] = ωp+ θ(f − d)− η(r + d)− cE[(ω + θ − ρ1η − ρ2θ)+]
= ω(p− cr) + θ(f − cr − d)− η(r + d)
−(c− cr)E[(ω + θ − ρ1θ − ρ2η)+] (1.4)
Assume ρi is distributed on [Ai, Bi] (0 ≤ Ai < Bi ≤ 1), with CDF Gi(·),
PDF gi(·), and mean value µi (i = 1, 2). Depending on the pricing decisions, the
integration area of E[(ω + θ − ρ1θ − ρ2η)+] is shown in Table 1.1.
Proposition 1.3. When the yield of replacement return and acquisition return are
independently distributed, the expected profit functionE[Π(r, f, p)] is jointly concave
in r, f , and p.
Proof: Equation 1.4 can be expressed as:
E[Π(r, f, p)] = ω(p− cr) + θ(f − cr − d)− η(r + d)
−(c− cr)E[(ω + θ − ρ1θ − ρ2η)+]
Since w, θ and η are linear functions of r, f and p, it is easy to verify that the
first three terms are concave. For the last term, E[(ω + θ− ρ1θ− ρ2η)+] is in fact
{w+(1−E[ρ1])θ−E[min{w+(1−ρ1)θ, ρ2η}]}. As 1−ρ1 and ρ2 are non-negative,
concavity is preserved under minimum and expectation operations(Bertsekas
et al., 2003). Therefore the sum of all the terms (E[Π(r, f, p)]) is also concave.
1.4 Numerical study
In this section, computational experiments are conducted based on the model
described above. The purpose of the numerical study is twofold. First, we use
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Table 1.1: Integration area
Range of ω and η Range of θ Integration limits
ω ≥ ηB1 θ > 0 A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ B1, A2 ≤
ρ2 ≤ B2
ηA1 ≤ ω ≤ ηB1
θ(1−A2) ≤ ηB1 − ω A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ θ(1−ρ2)+ωη for
A2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ B2
θ(1−B2) ≥ ηB1 − ω A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ B1 for A2 ≤
ρ2 ≤ B2
θ(1 − B2) ≤ ηB1 − ω ≤
θ(1−A2)
A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ θ(1−ρ2)+ωη for
1 − ηB1−ωθ ≤ ρ2 ≤ B2,
and A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ B1 for
A2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1− ηB1−ωθ
ω ≤ ηA1
θ(1−B2) ≥ ηB1 − ω A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ B1 for A2 ≤
ρ2 ≤ B2
θ(1−A2) ≤ ηA1 − ω Null
θ(1 − B2) ≤ ηA1 − ω ≤
θ(1−A2) ≤ ηB1 − ω
A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ θ(1−ρ2)+ωη for
A2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1− ηA1−ωθ
ηA1 − ω ≤ θ(1 − B2) ≤
θ(1−A2) ≤ ηB1 − ω
A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ θ(1−ρ−2)+ωη
for A2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ B2
θ(1 − B2) ≤ ηA1 − ω ≤
ηB1 − ω ≤ θ(1−A2)
A2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ ηρ1−ωθ for
A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ B1
ηA1 − ω ≤ θ(1 − B2) ≤
ηB1 − ω ≤ θ(1−A2)
A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ θ(1−ρ2)+ωη for
1 − ηB1−ωθ ≤ ρ2 ≤ B2,
and A1 ≤ ρ1 ≤ B2 for
A2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1− ηB1−ωθ
numerical results to investigate the advantages and limitations of different
pricing policies. Secondly, sensitivity analyses are conducted to find how the
optimal decisions change according to different parameter settings. This would
help managers make decisions when facing different market conditions.
Uniform distribution is used to describe the uncertainty of yield rate. However,
it is not to claim that uniform distribution is more suitable to model the usability
of return products. In literature, several distributions have been adopted for
study, Weibull distribution is used by Lo et al. (2007); Wee et al. (2007). Bakal
and Akcali (2006) use normal distribution in their analysis. Uniform distribution
has been used by Mukhopadhyay and Ma (2009); Tang et al. (2012). For the
numerical study, the following data sets are assigned as base value throughout
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this section:
a = 150, b = 3, δ = 100, γ = 3, α = 10, β = 10, cr = 5, d = 2, c = 30.
1.4.1 Effect of Random Yield Rate
Identical Yield Rate
Unlike most manufacturing systems, the quality level of supply is highly variable
and uncertain in remanufacturing business. In this subsection, sensitivity analysis
is conducted with the assumption of identical yield rate. In this situation, acqui-
sition return and replacement have the same yield condition. Analytic results are
presented in Section 1.3.2. For the sensitivity analysis, the standard deviation σ
of yield rate is fixed at at 1/75, and the mean value µ is varied from 0.3 to 0.8.
Figure 1.2 shows how the pricing decisions change accordingly. According to the
result, the optimal acquisition price r first increases with µ, after a threshold the
price slightly decreases as µ further increases. However, the optimal price to re-
placement purchase is always decreasing in µ within the range of computational
experiment. When yield rate is low, the optimal selling price to new customers is
independent of µ, but as µ further increases the firm can decrease the retail price
to attract more first time buyers. The result suggests that when expected return
yield is low, the firm would choose to acquire less cores(returns in remanufactur-
ing business) ((θ + η)B ≤ θ + ω), and demand is satisfied by both manufacturing
and remanufacturing. More specifically, if reusable return is less than the demand
from replacement purchase, all the new demand are satisfied by manufacturing.
Consequently, selling price p is independent of yield condition. When µ is high,
supply of reusable return is ample, the firm can then reduce the selling price to
attract more customers.
Corollary 1.1 shows when yield rate is identical and deterministic, the value
of price discrimination is independent in c, cr and ρ. However, the conclusion
under random yield is not easy to draw. Hence, computational experiments is
used to verify whether this result still holds in random yield situation. Firstly,
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Figure 1.2: Expected yield rate and pricing decisions
the yield variance σ2 is fixed at 1/75 to study the effect of expected yield rate µ.
Afterward, µ is fixed at 0.5 and σ is varied to see how yield variation affects firm’s
expected profit. Figure 1.3 compares the profit difference for the two pricing
policies when yield is random. Under both pricing schemes the expected profit
is increasing in µ and decreasing in σ. These observations are consistent with
intuitions as higher yield rate saves acquisition cost and lower randomness leads
to higher profits. It can be also observed that to offer a trade-in program is
especially favourable when the expected yield rate is low and the variance of
yield rate is large, as the percentage profit improvement is higher in such cases.
On the other hand, managers should also take into account the related cost of
such a market decision.
Another observation of Figure 1.3 is that, when yield rate is random, the
profit difference between the two pricing strategies is stable with respect to both
µ and σ. Moreover, although not shown here, numerical results also reveals the
profit difference is irrelevant to c and cr, which is consistent with the case of
deterministic yield rate.
Different Yield Rates
As stated in Section 1.3.3, the difference in return causation may lead to different
return quality conditions. In this subsection, we investigate the situation when
ρ1 and ρ2 are independent random variables. Table 1.2 summarizes how the
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a. Effects of expected yield rate b. Effect of standard deviation
Figure 1.3: Value of price discrimination
Table 1.2: Pricing decisions with respect to different yields
µ1 µ2 (r, f, p) E[Π]
0.4
0.4 (3.50, 27.67, 40.00) 598.83
0.6 (3.50, 25.17, 40.00) 702.58
0.8 (3.50, 22.67, 40.00) 843.83
0.6
0.4 (5.07, 27.17, 38.74) 862.82
0.6 (5.10, 25.06, 38.70) 960.03
0.8 (4.61, 22.49, 38.14) 1090.06
0.8
0.4 (5.16, 25.68, 36.42) 1107.96
0.6 (5.00, 23.85, 36.22) 1198.79
0.8 (4.68, 22.08, 35.83) 1305.09
optimal pricing decisions are affected by different yield rate conditions. When µ1
is low, the acquisition price r is unchanged to different levels of µ2. When µ1 is
in the middle level, r first increases in µ2 and then decreases. When µ1 is high, r
decreases in µ2. The selling price to replacement customer f is decreasing in both
µ1 and µ2. The selling price p is unchanged when reusable return is insufficient
to fulfill replacement demand, but decreases as return yield further increases.
This observation is similar to the case of identical yield.
Define the profit difference with and without trade-in rebate as the profit gain
from price discrimination. Figure 1.4 shows that when ρ1 and ρ2 are indepen-
dent random variables, the profitability of price discrimination policy is affected
by both return yield condition and replacement customers’ price sensitivity. As
indicated by Figure 1.4, the profit gain is increasing in the expected yield rate
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of replacement return while decreasing in that of acquisition return. This result
is different from the case when these two yield rates are identical. As Corollary
1.1 and Figure 1.3 show, when yield rates are identical, the profit gain remains
the same with respect to different yield rate level. The result highlights the im-
portance of identifying return yield conditions of different customer segments.
Especially, if replacement returns have high re-usability, it would be profitable for
the remanufacturer to offer high trade-in rebates.
Another observation of Figure 1.4 is that the profit gain is also affected by
replacement customers’ price sensitivity γ. This is consistent with Corollary 1.1,
which suggests when γ is low, the company has less incentive to offer higher
rebates to replacement customers. In practice, if the switching cost for existing
customer is low, the price sensitivity of replace demand would be high. In such
case, the remanufacturing company should offer higher trade-in rebates to retain
these customers.
The numerical study implies that, when µ2 and γ are high, a greater rebates
to replacement customer can stimulate the replacement sales and acquire more
reusable returns. Therefore, managers are recommended to use price discrimina-
tion policy under such circumstances.
Although not shown here, the numerical study also reveals that remanufac-
turer’s profit is affected by the yield variations, but the effect is minor comparing
with the above two factors.
1.4.2 Quality Dependent Rebate Policy
Up to this point, it is assumed that the remanufacturing company pays return
rebates to all the return customers without considering the inspection results of
return products. While in practice, some companies do check the reusability of
return products and pay the rebates based on inspection results.
Guide et al. (2003) consider the return acquisition problem with multiple
type of cores. They find that with the optimal pricing policies, high quality re-
turns may receive lower price than low quality returns. This is because they have
assumed the return of each quality class is independent. Ray et al. (2005) dis-
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Figure 1.4: Value of price discrimination, yield rate and price sensitivity
cuss the relation between products residual value and replacement decisions in a
deterministic environment. They assume the perceived residual value of product
depends on the remaining useful lifespan, and both customers and the remanufac-
turing firm are fully aware of this information. They find that an age-dependent
pricing policy does not add much value for the firm.
We now consider the policy when return rebates is only paid to those reusable
returns. For the reason of tractability, we adopts the assumption of independent
markets, which means the acquisition return and replacement return are not
affected by the price on the other market. In this study, the actual yield condition
can only be observed after inspection. It is hard to imagine that return customers
would know this information in advance. The remanufacturing firm, on the other
hand, is assumed to be well experienced and knows the yield distribution. Since
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return customers do not have knowledge on the yield distribution, their return
decisions only depend on the nominal acquisition price r. Therefore, with yield
dependent rebate policy, the acquisition return function is the same as the case
when rebates are paid to all return customers.
For the replacement customers, there are two possible scenarios for their
replacement decisions. Firstly, if replacement customers behave the same as ac-
quisition return customers, the replacement demand function is also unchanged.
In this case, the expected profit for the remanufacturing company becomes:
E[ΠR1(r, f, p)] = ωp+ θ(µ2f + (1− µ2)p− d)− η(µ1r + d)
−crE[min{ω + θ, ρ1η + ρ2θ}]− cE[(ω + θ − ρ1η − ρ2θ)+]
where µ1 and µ2 are the expected yield rate of acquisition and replacement
returns.
Secondly, although the return decisions are induced by the nominal rebates,
the replacement customers can make their purchasing decisions upon knowing
the inspection result. In addition, we assume that the customers are homoge-
neous in price sensitivity with respect to the return yield condition, which means
both reusable and unusable return customers react the same to the prices. There-
fore, the expected profit for the remanufacturing company becomes:
E[ΠR2(r, f, p)] = ωp+ µ2θ(f)(f − cr) + (1− µ2)θ(p)p− θ(f)d− η(µ1r + d)
−crE[min{ω + (1− ρ2)θ(p), ρ1η}]
−cE[(ω + (1− ρ2)θ(p)− ρ1η)+]
Figure 1.5 demonstrates how different rebate policies and yield conditions
affect the firm’s expected profit. If both replacement and acquisition customers
only look at the nominal prices, a quality dependent rebate policy improves firm’s
profit significantly. Furthermore, the firm decides to offer higher rebates to attract
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Figure 1.5: Performance of quality dependent rebate policy
more replacement customers, and increase the selling price p to generate more
profit from customers whose return cannot be remanufactured. This effect makes
the firm especially profitable when µ2 is low. While for the second situation, the
expected profit increment is much less. In this case, the replacement purchasing
decision differs regarding to the yield realization. Although the company saves
rebate costs for unusable returns, part of the replacement customers can only
buy at price p and their demand is deterred.
Our numerical results suggest that the profitability of such a quality based
rebate policy is largely affected by the return customers’ response. In remanufac-
turing research, few studies consider the effects of different rebate policies. The
actual reaction of return customers may fall between the above two scenarios.
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Further empirical studies are required to justify the assumption of customers’
reaction to different rebate policies.
1.5 Conclusions and Future Research
Matching supply and demand is the major concern of mangers who are dealing
with remanufacturing business. Many studies in remanufacturing systems have
assumed that supply and demand are two independent flows. This assumption
is reasonable for the business of manufacturing and sales. However, due to the
existence of large proportion of replacement customers, this assumption may not
hold for remanufacturing business.
This study investigates the pricing decisions of a remanufacturing firm who
is facing both new and replacement demand. A single period model is developed
to evaluate the benefit of adopting a price discrimination policy. It is one of the
first attempts to study the effect of replacement customers in remanufacturing
business. When the yield is deterministic, it is shown that the price discrimination
policy is applicable if replacement customers have high price sensitivity while
new customers and acquisition customers have low price sensitivity. When the
two return flows have different yield conditions, we show that the expected profit
of remanufacturing firm is concave in the pricing decisions when the return yields
are independently distributed. Due to the complexity of the problem, the closed
form solutions are not attainable. Computational experiments are conducted
to compare the profitability of different pricing schemes. The impact of return
yield conditions and customers’ price sensitivities are investigated. The numerical
results show that both factors are crucial for the remanufacturing firm. The price
discrimination policy makes the remanufacturing firm significantly better off
when the yield rate of replacement return is high. The payment scheme of return
rebates also affects firm’s profit. The numerical study shows that when return
rebates are only paid to reusable returns, the firm is significantly better off if
replacement and acquisition customers both make decisions only based on the
nominal repurchasing price.
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The present model has assumed deterministic demand function, in practice,
however, the demand information is usually imperfect. Consequently, it is mean-
ingful to incorporate random demand into the model. The company will then
decide on both pricing strategy and production quantity. Zhou and Yu (2011)
show that when the demand is linear and additive, and return is concave and
additive, the optimal pricing and stocking decisions follow a state dependent
policy. They also mention that if the random factor of demand and return are
not additive, the problem would become much more complicated. Our current
model has assumed proportional random yield. If we modify the randomness into
additive form on both demand and return sides, the resulting problem would
become similar to that of Zhou and Yu (2011), but with two different demand
segments, i.e. replacement and first time buyer. It would be reasonable to expect
that the optimal policy should follow a similar state dependent structure.
There are many other possible extensions for this model. One is to relax
the assumption of independence of new customer and replacement customer. In
practice, replacement customers may choose to purchase a new product with-
out returning their old one. The demand from this customer segment will then
depend on both f and p. It is expected that the optimal pricing policy would
be different, but the price discrimination policy should still outperform the uni-
form pricing policy. A limitation of the current model is that the yield rate is
taken as a fraction of reusable returns. In practice, return products are usually
under various quality conditions and require different remanufacturing costs.
The current model would be more realistic if multiple type of returns can be
incorporated. Besides, one can also consider the problem when remanufactured
products are imperfect substitutes of brand new products. It is interesting to see
how cannibalization effect would affect firm’s pricing decisions.
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Chapter 2




Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) are more reliant on bank loan fi-
nancing than big firms. As most SMEs are lack of financial transparency than
large enterprises, SMEs have difficulties in issuing bonds or selling shares on the
financial markets(Kaya, 2014). Nevertheless, to obtain sufficient bank financing
is still a challenge for many SMEs. The operational risks with SMEs are usually
much higher. They also have few assets as collateral and cannot provide com-
plete credit history. These problems may lead to higher financing cost or even
rejection of loan application. From the perspective of banks, the lending risks are
much higher with SMEs. The risks include both the possibility of non-repayment
and the potential loss when default happens. To fill the gap between banks’ risk
concerns and the financing needs of SMEs, a widely used financial solution is
the loan guarantee scheme. A loan guarantee is a promise of debt payment in
case the borrower defaults. The debt promise can either be partially or fully. The
guarantor can be credit guarantee corporations, government institutions or other
agencies.
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With loan guarantee schemes, banks’ loss when default occurs can be par-
tially or fully compensated. Therefore, the loan repayment is more secured for
the bank. The SME borrowers can benefit from the access to financing and possi-
bly lower financing cost. Since SMEs make great contribution to employment and
national economy, governments have been supporting SME financing through
various methods. Accordingly, many loan guarantee schemes are established
by governments institutions. For example, the Hong Kong SME Loan Guaran-
tee Scheme (2014) provides up to HK$ 6,000,000 or 50% of loan amount for
qualified SME bank loans. Other loan guarantee agencies include Canada Small
Business Financing(CSBF), Malaysian Credit Guarantee Corporation, etc.
However, those guarantee schemes offered by third parties cannot always
meet the SMEs’ financing needs. Besides the restrictions on coverage rate,
coverage amount and loan period, these guarantee schemes also have specified
loan purpose. For example, the CSBF program cannot be used to finance work-
ing capital(Riding et al., 2007). In addition, these guarantee schemes charge
extra guarantee fee to the SME borrowers which increases SMEs’ borrowing
cost. There are also arguments about government established credit guarantee
programs. Opponents criticise that there is no sufficient justification of using
public fund to sustain guarantee schemes(Green, 2003).
SMEs’ difficulties in obtaining sufficient financing also affect the performance
of supply chains. As a supply chain member, when a SME suffers from financial
inability, other supply chain partners would face higher costs or even lose
potential revenue. Meanwhile, based on historical transactions and long term
cooperation, supply chain members may have better knowledge about their
partners than banks and other third party agencies. As a result, supply chain
participants have developed various supply chain financing solutions which in-
cludes the loan guarantee scheme. Firms with good credit worthiness can reduce
their supply chain partners’ borrowing cost through offering loan guarantee. An
example is the China Minsheng Bank which provides “Core Enterprise Guarantee
Loan” program to SMEs which serve as suppliers or retailers to large enterprises
(China Minsheng Bank, 2014). The SMEs are able to obtain more financing with
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guarantee from their big partners. Since the interest rate is based on large firm’s
strong credit rating, SMEs’ financing cost would also be reduced. In helping their
SME partners, large enterprises could benefit from more efficient supply chain
transactions.
Among the various operational risks faced by SMEs, we are of particular
interest of the unreliable production process. The causation of unreliable supply
varies from natural disaster, labor strike to immature technology, etc. These risks
are usually uncontrollable for SMEs. The joint impact of unreliable production
and financial constraint on the performance of supply chain is still unclear. So
far, supply chain research has paid little attention to this area.
A number of interesting research questions arise: When should a retailer offer
financial support to a SME supplier with production risks? What is the magnitude
of profit improvement from such finance scheme? What is the effect of supplier’s
different financial status as well as the supply reliability?
This study develops a two echelon supply chain model to determine the
joint operational and financing decisions. We explicitly evaluate the impact of
financial constraints on the supply chain performance. To our knowledge, this
study is one of the first efforts which investigate the supply chain contracting
issues under supply uncertainty and financial constraints. Our work contributes
to the literature in several ways. First, we show that supplier’s financial constraint
does affect retailer’s decision and supply chain profitability. Second, by comparing
the situation with and without financing, we establish the conditions under which
different financial and operational strategies should be chosen. Our results also
provide managerial insights for practitioners who are facing similar situations.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the
related literature. We then present our base case model with random production
yield and forced compliance in Section 2.3. In practice, retailers often recourse
to backup sourcing when facing unreliable supply processes. In Section 2.4,
we extend our base model to cope with backup supply. The trade off between
loan guarantee and backup sourcing is investigated. We also consider the use
of advance payment, and compare its performance with loan guarantee scheme.
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Since many supply chains are operated as decentralized systems, in Section 2.5,
we further use a Stackelberg game formulation to study the problem when the
production decision is made by the supplier. Finally we conclude our study and
discuss future research directions in Section 2.6.
2.2 Literature Review
This study lies at the joint interface of operations and finance research. It is
not until recently that this area has drawn much attention. Studies in this area
are quite multidisciplinary. Related research streams include supply chain con-
tracting, firms’ financing decisions, inventory and production management, etc.
Among the various research questions, we are of particular interests in the financ-
ing and ordering decisions when facing unreliable supply process.
2.2.1 Supply Chain Contracting and Financing
In the context of supply chain contracting, early research usually ignores the
impact of financial decisions. For a broad review of supply chain contracting, we
refer to Cachon (2003). As the importance of joint consideration of operations
and finance is being realized gradually, the research in this area is also growing.
Banks usually divide their financing services into buyer finance, seller finance, and
middleman service. While from the perspective of supply chain management, we
classify the existing research into individual financing and cooperative financing.
Some studies focus on single firm’s operational and financial decisions. Chao
et al. (2008) study the inventory control problem of a self-financing retailer in a
multiperiod setting. The replenishment decision is constrained by on hand capital
which updates periodically. They show the conditions under which the optimal
control policies are identical through periods. Other models in this research
stream include initial public offerings (Babich and Sobel, 2004), trade credit
(Gupta and Wang, 2009), etc.
However, these studies have focused on the decision making process of in-
dividual firm. The interplay between supply chain partners as well as financial
institutions are not captured. Realizing this shortcomings, some other papers
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investigate the interplay of financial and operations decisions between different
firms and among supply chain members. Buzacott and Zhang (2004) analyze the
interaction between a capital limited retailer and a bank. Dada and Hu (2008)
consider a similar model and derive the loan scheme which coordinates the chan-
nel. Chen and Cai (2011) further analyze the case when a loan is provided by a
third-party logistic(3PL) firm or the supplier. They show that under both schemes
the supply chain profit outperforms the case when the loan is provided by a bank.
Zhou and Groenevelt (2008) consider a financial scheme in which the retailer
borrows from the bank and pays the loan principal, and the supplier subsidizes
the interests. They show that comparing with trade credit financing, such a loan
financing scheme improves the profit of entire supply chain. Kouvelis and Zhao
(2011) study the supplier’s optimal price-only contract when facing a budget
constrained retailer and bankruptcy cost. Kouvelis and Zhao (2012) also study
a price-only contract with both budget constrained supplier and retailer. The
retailer can either choose trade credit financing or bank financing. It is shown
that under mild conditions, the retailer always prefers supplier financing to bank
financing. Caldentey and Chen (2011) analyze a similar problem where supplier
can use credit contract to finance a budget constrained retailer. They conclude
that suppliers finance is preferable to bank financing. Yang and Birge (2011) ex-
tend the previous models to the case where supplier financing and bank financing
can be jointly used. They also show that supplier financing is preferred to bank
financing. They further validates that such inventory financing pattern through a
sample of firm-level data. Chen and Gupta (2014) study the financing schemes
for budget constrained supplier under consignment contract setting. They show
that bank financing works as substitute to retailer’s direct financing and com-
plement to retailer’s commitment financing. Tanrisever et al. (2012) investigate
the value of reverse factoring where the OEM can work with a bank to reduce
supplier’s financing cost.
Some other papers examine the effect of different payment policies in a serial
inventory system. Luo and Shang (2012) study a two-stage inventory system
where both prepayment and delayed payment are allowed. They show the op-
timal inventory and payment decisions follow threshold policies, and a flexible
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payment scheme out performs a strict payment scheme. Song and Tong (2012)
provide a generalized framework to study the joint inventory and cash manage-
ment problem in a serial supply chain with different payment schemes. More
recently, Chen et al. (2013) conduct a laboratory study on the effect of payment
schemes on inventory decisions. They find the observations of inventory decisions
are more consistent with the prospective accounting theory than expected-profit-
maximizing model. Our model also considers the option of retailer’s advance
payment. Comparing with loan guarantee scheme, we show that the supplier is
always willing to accept such a financing support. However, it benefits the retailer
only when the financing cost is low and supplier’s initial capital is relatively high.
Nevertheless, these studies have focused on the risks from the demand side.
Few studies look at the joint impact of unreliable supply process and financial
constraints. Some exceptions are as follows. Babich (2010), whose work shares
some similarities with this study, considers manufacturer’s joint capacity ordering
and financial subsidy problem when facing a risky supplier. He identifies the con-
ditions under which the subsidy policy follows a subsidize-up-to structure. Unlike
his work which mainly stand at manufacturer’s perspective, we consider both
supplier’s and retailer’s interests, as well as bank’s risk free return requirement.
More recently, Tunca and Zhu (2014) compare buyer intermediated financing
with commercial loans and factoring. They argue that buyer intermediated
financing improves supply chain efficiency by transferring the risk among the
supply chain partners and financing institutions in a more efficient way. Our
model differs with this work in that we consider the loan guarantee scheme
where the coverage ratio is decided by the retailer. A closely related work to
ours is Wu et al. (2014). They also investigate the use of loan guarantee. While
instead of looking at the impact of guarantee on supplier’s profitability, they
investigate the necessary guarantee level which meets bank’s interest rate limit.
In our base model, we assume the supplier can only choose whether to borrow
or not. We then relax this assumption and allow voluntary compliance where the
supplier can choose the production input level to maximize supplier’s profit. We
incorporate supplier’s budget constraint in a Stackelberg model and discuss the
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supply chain performance with the usage of different financing schemes.
2.2.2 Unreliable Supplies
This study is also related the abundant literature on supply risk management.
Three different approaches are usually adopted to model the supply uncertainty,
namely random capacity, random yield and random disruption. Dada et al. (2007)
study the supplier selection problem using general reliability assumptions. They
conclude that cost has higher priority than reliability. A supplier should be se-
lected only if all less-expensive suppliers are selected. Babich (2010) assumes
that the supply capacity is affected by supplier’s financial state. He studies buyer’s
optimal subsidy and ordering decisions.
In this study, we mainly explore the problems of random yield and random
disruption. Li and Zheng (2006) consider the joint pricing and inventory deci-
sions in a periodic review systems with random yield and demand. They show
the optimality of a threshold type replenishment policy. The optimal production
quantity and the optimal price in each period are both decreasing in the starting
inventory. Serel (2008) investigates a supply chain with a retailer, an unreliable
supplier and a reliable manufacturer. He analyses the retailer’s ordering problem
as well as the manufacturer’s pricing problem. Gu¨ler and Bilgic¸ (2009) explore
an assembly system with random yield and random demand. They assume forced
compliance where the supplier’s input level must equal to manufacturer’s order
quantities. They derive coordination contract which includes a penalty to the
worst performing supplier. He and Zhang (2008) consider a two level supply
chain where the unreliable supplier can decide the production quantity. They
discuss different risk sharing mechanisms between the supplier and retailer. In a
similar setting, Wang (2009) investigates the impact of vendor management in-
ventory. Tang and Kouvelis (2014) study the contract coordination problem with
random production yield and competing retailers. Li et al. (2013) study a similar
problem and find the accept-all type of contract that coordinates the supply chain.
They further show this contract is applicable to the situation of multi-suppliers.
Similarly, our model also consider the problem of voluntary compliance. Unlike
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those studies which mainly investigate the supply chain coordination problem,
we focus on the implications of different supplier’s financial status and financial
schemes.
Tomlin (2006) discusses the use of inventory control, sourcing, and accep-
tance strategies to cope with supply chain disruptions. Wang et al. (2010) com-
pare the strategies of dual sourcing and process improvement when facing ran-
dom capacity or random yield. They find that for random yield model, as sup-
plier’s cost heterogeneity increases, the attractiveness of process improvement
reduces, while if the reliability heterogeneity is high, process improvement can
be favored over dual sourcing. Dong and Tomlin (2012) investigate how a manu-
facturing firm manages disruption risk by purchasing business interruption insur-
ance, investing in inventory, and availing of emergency sourcing. They establish
conditions under which insurance can be complementary to inventory and emer-
gency sourcing. In our model, it is shown that sourcing from backup supply and
proving guarantee to the unreliable supplier are substitutes.
Yang et al. (2009) use mechanism design theory to investigate manufacturer’s
optimal contract when the supply disruption risk is private information to the sup-
plier. Tang et al. (2013) consider a decentralized supply chain with endogenous
disruption probability. They assume the disruption probability can be reduced
by exerting costly efforts. The buyer can encourage the supplier’s investment
through financial subsidy. They show that when demand is stochastic, the buyer
may use subsidy and increase ordering quantity at the same time. In our study,
we take the supply uncertainties as uncontrollable process. Our model obtain
similar results which shows that the retailer may need to provide guarantee and
place a larger order size simultaneously to keep supplier’s incentive align.
2.3 The Base Model
We consider a supply chain consists of a supplier, a retailer and a bank. The
supplier has limited internal fund and the production process is subject to un-
controllable risk. The delivered quantity is a fraction ζ of the total production
quantity which is distributed between [0, 1], with pdf g(·) and cdf G(·). The as-
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sumption of random proportional yield is commonly used in the literature to
model supply uncertainty (Rajaram and Karmarkar, 2002; Federgruen and Yang,
2009). Furthermore, we assume the supplier is budget constrained with initial
capital level b. The initial capital can be fully used to finance the production
process and the supplier has no other assets. Without loss of generality, the unit
production cost is normalized to 1.
When retailer’s order size is less than b, we assume forced compliance on
the supplier’s production decision, which means supplier’s production size is the
same as retailer’s order size. If retailer’s order is more than b, the supplier does
not have sufficient internal fund to fulfill retailer’s order. The supplier can decide
whether or not to take a bank loan to finance the production. That is, if the
borrowing cost is higher than the expected extra revenue, then the supplier only
produces using the initial fund b; if the borrowing cost is less than the expected
extra revenue, the supplier is then willing to take a loan y − b from the bank and
produces at y.
We assume the bank is risk neutral with risk-free interest rate rf . This financ-
ing cost rf can be regarded as deadweight cost caused by potential bankruptcy
risk or other financial distress cost. It can also be viewed as transaction cost or
financing fee. To focus on the operational transactions, we assume both retailer
and the supplier have no other investment opportunities.
The retailer faces stochastic demand D with pdf f(·), cdf F (·) and ccdf F¯ (·).
Both the wholesale price w and retail price to end customer p are exogenous.
There is no penalty cost for shortage or salvage value for unsold inventory. In
addition to the order quantity y, the retailer also decides loan guarantee level
x. As stated above, the borrowing cost can be higher than the supplier’s revenue
margin, the loan guarantee is used to help the SME supplier to get a loan at lower
interest rate. Detailed discussion of this loan guarantee is presented in bank’s
problem. We assume the retailer is fully aware of the supplier’s financial status
and yield distribution. After supplier’s production yield realizes, retailer’s order
payment is first used as loan repayment.
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2.3.1 Bank’s Return and Loan Limit
Under the risk neutral assumption, the bank is indifferent between a fixed pay-
ment (y − b)+(1 + rf ) and an uncertain payment with the same expected value.
Denote the loan interest rate as r, the value of r is determined as:
(y − b)+(1 + rf ) = E[min{wyζ + x((y − b)+(1 + r)− wyζ)+,
(y − b)+(1 + r)}] (2.1)
The RHS of Equation 2.1 represents the two possible scenarios of supplier’s
repayment. When the production yield is too low that retailer’s payment
upon order delivery is less than the loan principal plus loan interest, the bank
will then collect the order payment wyζ and retailer’s guarantee payment
x((y − b)+(1 + r) − wyζ)+. When production yield is high enough such that
wyζ ≥ (y − b)+(1 + r), the bank gets full repayment, and the supplier collects
the rest amount wyζ − (y − b)+(1 + r). We first establish several basic properties
of bank’s loan interest rate.
Lemma 2.1. For loan size (y − b)+, bank’s loan interest rate has following proper-
ties:
a. If x = 1, then r = rf ;
b. if x < 1, then r ≥ rf ;
c. r is decreasing in x;
d. r is increasing in y.
Lemma 2.1 shows that the loan interest rate is increasing in both order
size and guarantee level. We then look at the range of feasible loan size. Since
the order size is decided by the retailer and the supplier can only choose
whether to take a loan or not, we focus on retailer’s feasible order quantity. The
maximum loan size will be the difference between the maximum order size and b.
33
Lemma 2.2. If x > 0 or wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf , there is no ordering limit; if x = 0 and
wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , the maximum feasible order size is
b(1+rf )
1+rf−wE[ζ] .
Lemma 2.2 states the feasible order size, and consequently the maximum
loan size. A special case is that the yield is a fixed fraction of the production
quantity ζ0(0 < ζ0 ≤ 1). To the same with Lemma 2.2, there is no borrowing limit
when wζ0 ≥ 1 + rf or x > 0, and there exists maximum order size otherwise.
For the case wyζ0 ≥ (y − b)(1 + rf ), the SME can fully repay the loan. The
corresponding interest rate is always rf , and a guarantee does not take effect.
When the SME cannot repay the loan alone, wyζ0 < (y−b)(1+rf ) and x > 0, the
interest rate is given by: r = (1+rf−x)(y−b)−w(1−x)yζ0x(y−b) . It can be easily verified that
the results of Lemma 2.1 still holds for the deterministic yield situation. As the
deterministic yield problem can be viewed as a special case, we will then focus
on the problem with uncertain yield. In addition, from now on, we restrict our
discussion within the case where the order size is feasible. Furthermore, besides
the debt capacity decided by the bank, we also consider supplier’s incentive
issue which constrained retailer’s decisions more tightly. The detailed analysis is
presented as follows.
2.3.2 Supplier’s Profit Requirement
We first consider the case when supplier’s production quantity is the same as
retailer’s order size. We then analyze the impact of this production policy on
supplier’s profit and derive retailer’s necessary guarantee level. Define t(x, y) as
the threshold yield level such that retailer’s order payment can fully repay the
loan:
t(x, y) =
(y − b)+(1 + r(x, y))
wy
Equation 2.1 can be rewritten as:
(y − b)+(1 + rf ) =E[min {xwyt+ (1− x)wζy,wyt}] (2.2)
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=xwyt+ (1− x)wyE[min {ζ, t}]
Lemma 2.3. For y > b, the threshold t is decreasing in b and x, while increasing in
y and rf .
According to the definition of t, the probability that the supplier can fully
repay the loan is F¯ (t). On the other hand, the default probability is F (t). Lemma
2.3 shows that when supplier’s initial capital is higher, it is less likely for the
supplier to go bankruptcy, while it is more likely that the supplier will fully repay
the loan. The intuition for x, y and rf is similar.
With the notation of threshold yield level, the supplier’s expected profit at the
end of period is expressed as:
pis(x, y) = wy
∫ 1
t(x,y)
(ζ − t(x, y))dG(ζ)−max{y, b} (2.3)
or, equivalently
pis =
 wE[ζ]y − y, if y ≤ b∫ 1
t wy(ζ − t)dG(ζ)− b, if y > b
When y > b and the financing cost is high, supplier’s revenue increment
from order fulfilling can be less than the corresponding financing cost. In such
case, the supplier is better off to produce with the internal capital and not to
take a loan. To keep supplier’s interest in line, the retailer can reduce supplier’s
borrowing cost through providing financial support. In other words, the retailer
shares the supply risk through loan guarantee scheme so that the supplier is
willing to access the financial market to launch a larger production quantity. We
consider the supplier’s profit requirement constraint (or supplier participation
constraint):
pis(x, y) ≥ pis(x, b), for y ≥ b (2.4)
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where x denotes retailer’s guarantee level, y and b denotes supplier’s produc-
tion decision.
When supplier’s production quantity equals to y and no guarantee is provided,
according to Equation 2.2 and 2.3, supplier’s profit function can be written as:
pis = wyE[ζ]−max{y, b} − (y − b)+(1 + rf ) (2.5)
It can be obtained that if y > b and x = 0, the supplier’s profit is increasing in y
if wE[ζ] > 1+rf ; and decreasing in y otherwise. As a result, when wE[ζ] < 1+rf ,
the supplier is not willing to produce more than b if the retailer provides zero
guarantee. The effect of guarantee on supplier’s profit is summarized as follows.
Lemma 2.4. Given y > b, suppose the supplier takes bank loan to produce at y,
supplier’s profit is increasing in x and decreasing in rf .
With positive guarantee, the financing cost and supply risk are shared
between the retailer and supplier. Lemma 2.4 shows that the retailer’s guarantee
does improve supplier’s expected profit. Denote rb as the loan interest when
rf = wE[ζ]− 1 and x = 0, and rb is a function of y. The following result reveals
the effect of loan interest rate on the supplier’s profit. Again, we assume the
supplier always uses a bank loan to produce at y.
Lemma 2.5. For y > b, when supplier’s production quantity is y, supplier’s profit
is decreasing in r. In addition, when r = rb, pis(y) = pis(b).
Lemma 2.5 shows that if the loan interest rate r is greater than the break even
interest rb, the supplier becomes worse off when taking a bank loan to produce
at y. According to Lemma 2.1, as supplier’s loan interest rate is decreasing in
loan guarantee level, we can now characterize buyer’s feasible ordering quantity
and guarantee level with consideration of supplier’s participation constraint.
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Proposition 2.1. Consider the case when y > b: if wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf , pis(y) ≥ pis(b)
for any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; if wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , there exists ylb such that
1. for b < y < ylb, pis(x, y) < pis(b) for any guarantee level x ∈ [0, 1];
2. for y ≥ ylb, there exists x such that for x > x, pis(x, y) ≥ pis(b);
where ylb = {y | (y − b)wE[ζ] = E[min{wyζ, (y − b)(1 + rf )}]}, and x = {x |
(y − b) (1 + rf ) = E[min {x(y − b)(1 + rb) + (1− x)wζy, (y − b)(1 + rb)}]}.
When bank’s risk free rate is low, it is profitable for the supplier to take a loan
and produce at y even if there is no guarantee. While if the risk free rate is high,
the supplier is willing to borrow only if y > ylb and x > x. The lower bound of
the order quantity is due to the fact that even a 100% guarantee is provided, the
loan interest rate can only be reduced to rf . Therefore, for order size between
(b, ylb), taking bank loan always makes the supplier worse off. This result implies
that retailer’s feasible ordering quantity is [0, b] ∪ [ylb,+∞).
Given an order size y ≥ ylb, the minimum guarantee level x(y) can be
found in two steps. The first step is to determine the break even loan inter-
est rate rb for the same order size. After rb is obtained, we can then take
rb into Equation 2.1 and find the corresponding x: {x | (y1 − b) (1 + rf ) =
E[min {x(y1 − b)(1 + rb) + (1− x)wζy1, (y1 − b)(1 + rb)}]}.
Example: Let w = 2.4, b = 20, and the production yield uniformly distributed
between [0, 1]. The conclusion of Proposition 2.1 is graphed in Figure 2.1. Con-
sider the loan interest as a function of bank’s risk free rate, retailer’s guarantee
level and order size. Figure 2.1.a illustrates the relation between bank’s loan
interest rate and retailer’s order size when no guarantee is provided. The loan
interest rate is increasing in both rf and y. If rf = wE[ζ]− 1 and x = 0, the sup-
plier’s profit is indifferent between taking a bank loan or not. When y → ∞, rb
asymptotically approaches to w−1. As stated in Lemma 2.2, when rf > wE[ζ]−1
and x = 0, there exists maximum loan size is y¯− b. We denote the corresponding
loan interest rate as r¯, where r¯ = wy¯y¯−b −1. Furthermore, r¯ is decreasing in rf with
lower limit w − 1.
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a. Effect of rf and y, x = 0












rf = 0.4, x = 0
rf = 0.4, x = 0.5
rf = 0.4, x = 1
rf = 0.2, x = 0
r¯
ylb
b. Effect of positive x
Figure 2.1: Effect of rf , x and y on loan interest rate
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Given y > b and rf > wE[ζ] − 1, the loan interest rate without guarantee
is greater than rb and pis(rf , 0, y) < pis(b). In such case, supplier’s borrow-
ing cost is higher than the expected revenue increment. The buyer needs
to provide enough guarantee so that supplier’s profit with borrowing is no
less than pis(b). In Figure 2.1.b, for rf = 0.4 and wE[ζ] − 1 = 0.2, we have
r(0.4, 0, y) > rb(0.2, 0, y). When order size is 80.03, the supplier is willing to take
a loan only if r(0.4, x, 80.03) ≤ rb(0.2, 0, 80.03). The retailer needs to provide
guarantee which is no less than x = 0.5. Figure 2.1.b also shows that for
order size between (b, ylb), r(0.4, x, y) is higher than rb(0.2, 0, y) even if a fully
guarantee is provided. This observation validates the result in Proposition 2.1,
which means loan guarantee cannot meet the supplier’s profit requirement in
this ordering range.
Corollary 2.1. x is increasing in b and rf , decreasing in w and y.
Corollary 2.1 points out that when the supplier has more initial capital or
the bank’s risk free rate is higher, the minimum guarantee level required by the
supplier also increases. On the other hand, when supplier’s wholesale price is
high or the order quantity is high, the required minimum guarantee level is lower.
We take supplier’s initial capital for further explanation. When b increases, the
loan repayment is more likely to be totally borne by the supplier. Although the
loan size is reduced(both principal and interest), the supplier would take more
proportion of the financing cost. Taking a bank loan is no longer attractive for
the supplier unless the retailer increases the guarantee level. The impact of rf , w
and y are similar.
We confine our discussion to the case where guarantee level is between
[0, 1]. When the minimum guarantee require by the supplier is equal to 1, the
corresponding order quantity is defined as the lower bound quantity for viable
loan scheme. Corollary 2.2 shows how the lower bound changes according to
different parameter values.
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Corollary 2.2. ylb is increasing in b and rf , and decreasing in w.
As b and rf increases, the minimum order quantity to keep supplier’s incen-
tive compatible is also increasing. The retailer needs to increase guarantee level
or order with larger quantity. When retailer’s desired ordering quantity is less
than ylb, since the guarantee level cannot be more than one hundred percent, the
retailer either enlarges the order size to make a loan attractive to the supplier or
just lets supplier produce with the initial capital. The impact of wholesale price
w is to the opposite of b and rf .
2.3.3 Retailer’s Problem
In this subsection, we consider retailer’s profit optimization problem. Before the
selling season, the retailer needs to decide the loan guarantee level x and order
quantity y. The retailer’s profit maximization problem is given by:
Πr = max
x,y
EζED[−wyζ + pmin{yζ,D} − xwy(t− ζ)+]
s.t. 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
y ≥ 0
pis(x, y) ≥ pis(0, b) ∀y ∈ (b,+∞)
(y − b)(1 + rf ) = E[min{wyζ + xwy(t− ζ)+, wyt}] ∀y ∈ (b,+∞)
The expected profit function can also be written as:
pir(x, y) = pir(0, y)− xwyEζ [(t− ζ)+] (2.6)




The first term in Equation 2.6 represents retailer’s profit when no guarantee
is offered and supplier’s production quantity is y. The second term represents
the expected guarantee cost. When the supplier has sufficient capital, the retailer
only needs to decide the order quantity. It is easy to verify that pir(0, y) is concave
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in y. When the supplier has limited capital, to derive retailer’s optimal decisions,
we first investigate the optimal guarantee decision for a given order quantity.
Lemma 2.6. Given y > b and the supplier decides to produce y units, the retailer’s
profit is decreasing in x.
Based on Lemma 2.6, several direct conclusions can be drawn. If rf ≤ wE[ζ]−
1, as the supplier is willing to take a bank loan without retailer’s guarantee,
and the guarantee cost is non-negative, the retailer should not provide positive
guarantee in such case. The optimal order quantity will be y∗ which uniquely
maximize pir(0, y). For rf > wE[ζ] − 1, it has been shown that the possible
production quantity is [0, b]∪ [ylb,+∞). Combining the fact that the loan interest
rate is decreasing in x and the supplier is willing to borrow only when r ≤ rb, we
can obtain that for order size y > ylb, the retailer’s optimal decision is to provide
the minimum guarantee x(y).
After determining retailer’s optimal guarantee decision, we then look at the
case rf > wE[ζ] − 1 and derive retailer’s optimal order quantity. The retailer’s
profit with optimally decided guarantee is given by:
pir =

pir(0, y), y ≤ b
pir(0, b), b < y < ylb
pir(x(y), y), y ≥ ylb
where x(y) and ylb follows previous definition.
For y > ylb > b, define tb = (y− b)(1 + rb)/wy. According to Equation 2.1 and
the definition of rb, we have:
(y − b)wE[ζ] = wy
∫ tb
0
ζdG(ζ) + wytbG¯(tb) (2.7)
and (y − b)(1 + rf ) = wy
∫ tb
0








(tb − ζ)dG(ζ) = (y − b)(1 + rf − wE[ζ]) (2.8)
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Consequently, the buyer’s expected profit with optimal guarantee is:




= pir(0, y)− (y − b)(1 + rf − wE[ζ])
The above equation shows that when the minimum guarantee x is provided,
retailer’s unit guarantee cost is 1 + rf − wE[ζ]. It is equivalent to the case that
the retailer pays the interest cost higher than supplier’s expected revenue. The
following proposition summarizes retailer’s optimal guarantee and ordering
decisions.
Proposition 2.2. If rf ≤ wE[ζ] − 1 or b ≥ y∗, it is optimal for the retailer to
order y∗ units and provide no guarantee. If rf > wE[ζ] − 1 and b < y∗, define
y′ ≡ {y | ∫ 10 pζF¯ (yζ)g(ζ)dζ − (1 + rf ) = 0}, retailer’s optimal decision is as
follows:
a. for b < b1, order y′ and provides guarantee x(y′);
b. for b1 < b < b2, order ylb and provides guarantee x(ylb);
c. for b2 ≤ b < y∗, order b and provides no guarantee.
where b1 ≡ {b | ylb(b) = y′}, and b2 ≡ {b | pir(x, ylb(b)) = pir(0, b)}.
As can be seen, the retailer’s optimal ordering and guarantee decisions are
largely dependent on the SME’s initial capital level. In the following content, we
discuss the further implications and compare the results under different problem
settings.
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2.4 Backup Supply and Advance Payment
2.4.1 Impact of Backup Supply
In the previous analysis, we have discussed the sourcing and financing problem
with a single supplier. In facing supply uncertainties, some manufacturers turn to
multisourcing or backup sourcing to mitigate the supply risks. In this section, we
consider the sourcing problem as a two stage decision process. In the first stage,
the retailer announces guarantee level x and order size y1 to the unreliable SME
supplier. After observing the production yield, the retailer can choose to place
another order y2 to the backup suppler. The backup supplier is assumed to be
perfectly reliable with wholesale price v. The total stocking level is then y1ζ + y2.
Since SME supplier’s profit is only affected by x and y1, our previous conclusion
of supplier’s loan participation decision still holds in the two stage problem. The
retailer’s problem with backup supply is as follows:
Πr = max
x,y1
Eζ{−wy1ζ − xwy1(t− ζ)+ + max
y2
ED[−vy2 + pmin{y1ζ + y2, D}|ζ]}
s.t. 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
y1 ≥ 0
y2 ≥ 0
pis(x, y1) ≥ pis(0, b) ∀y1 ∈ (b,+∞)
(y1 − b)(1 + rf ) = E[min{wy1ζ + xwy1(t− ζ)+, wy1t}] ∀y1 ∈ (b,+∞)
We first characterize retailer’s optimal policy in the second stage.
Lemma 2.7. For any guarantee level x, and first stage order quantity y1, the
optimal ordering policy in the second stage is order up to B, where B ≡ F−1(p−vp ).
Lemma 2.7 shows that retailer’s second stage decision follows standard
newsvendor solution. The optimal stocking up to level is independent of the first
stage decisions and yield realization. The actual backup order quantity depends
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on the delivery quantity of the SME supplier. When the delivery quantity y1ζ
is less than the optimal ordering up to level B, the optimal backup ordering
quantity is B − y1ζ. On the other hand, if the SME supplier’s delivery quantity is
higher than B, the retailer should not place a backup order. Based on the optimal
ordering policy in the second stage, the retailer’s problem can be written as:
max
x,y1
Eζ{−wy1ζ − xwy1(t− ζ)+ + ED[pmin{max{B, y1ζ}, D}]− v(B − y1ζ)+]}
We now consider the optimal guarantee level for given y1. As can be seen,
the retailer’s expected guarantee cost is the same as the single sourcing problem.
Therefore, Lemma 2.6 still holds for the dual sourcing problem. When wE[ζ] ≥
1 + rf , the supplier’s expected profit is increasing in retailer’s ordering quantity
even without guarantee, and the retailer should not provide positive guarantee.
When wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , as discussed in the previous section, the supplier is willing
to take bank loan only when y ≥ ylb and x > x. In such case, retailer’s problem
is further rewritten as:
max
y1>ylb
Eζ{−wy1ζ − (y1 − b)+(1 + rf − wE[ζ])
+ ED[pmin{max{B, y1ζ}, D}]− v(B − y1ζ)+]}
Notice that when the first stage order quantity y1 is less than the second
stage ordering up to level B, a positive backup order is always needed. Since the
back up supply is perfect reliable, an interesting question would be whether the
retailer should order from the unreliable supplier.
Lemma 2.8. If w > v, the retailer’s optimal first stage ordering quantity is zero.
A special case is when v = w. If the retailer doesn’t need to provide guarantee,
any first stage order size between [0, B] is optimal as the marginal first stage
ordering cost is equal to the backup supplier’s wholesale price. If bank’s risk
free interest rate is high, rf > wE[ζ] − 1, then the optimal first stage ordering
quantity is between 0 to min{b, B}. We focus on the case v > w and derive
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retailer’s optimal first stage decisions.
Proposition 2.3. Given v > w, define y∗1 as the solution to:
∫ B/y1
0 vζdG(ζ) +∫ 1
B/y1
pF¯ (y1ζ)ζdG(ζ) − wE[ζ] = 0; y′1 as the solution to:
∫ B/y1
0 vζdG(ζ) +∫ 1
B/y1
pF¯ (y1ζ)ζdG(ζ)− 1− rf = 0.
1. If rf ≤ wE[ζ] − 1 or b ≥ y∗, it is optimal to order y∗1 units in the first stage
and provide no guarantee.
2. If rf > vE[ζ] − 1 and b < y∗1, it is optimal to order b units in the first stage
and provide no guarantee.
3. If wE[ζ] − 1 < rf < vE[ζ] − 1 and b < y∗1, the retailer’s optimal first stage
decisions are:
a. for b < b1, order y′1 and provide guarantee x(y′1);
b. for b1 < b < b2, order ylb and provide guarantee x(ylb);
c. for b2 ≤ b < y∗1, order b and provide no guarantee.
where b1 ≡ {b | ylb(b) = y′1}, and b2 ≡ {b | pir(x, ylb(b)) = pi1(0, b)}.
Notes: For rf = wE[ζ] − 1, we assume the supplier is cooperative. The as-
sumption implies that when the order size is greater than b, the supplier is willing
to take bank loan to produce more even if the expected profit remains the same as
the no borrowing case. This assumption is consistent with the loan participation
constraint.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the optimal first stage policy for different levels of sup-
plier’s initial capital and bank’s risk free rate. In summary, when supplier’s initial
fund is high or bank’s risk free interest rate is less than wE[ζ] − 1, the retailer
should not provide guarantee. The optimal order quantity is equal to the case
when the supplier has no financial constraint. If supplier’s initial capital is less
than y∗1 and bank’s risk free interest is higher than the vE[ζ]− 1, then the retailer
should provide no guarantee and simply order b from the SME supplier. If rf is














Figure 2.2: Retailer’s optimal first stage ordering policies
retailer’s optimal decision falls in one of three different cases. For b less than
b1, it is optimal for the retailer to order y′1 and provide corresponding guarantee
x(y′1). If b is between (b1, b2), because of supplier’s loan participation constraint,
retailer’s optimal decision is to order ylb(b) and provide guarantee x(ylb(b)). Fi-
nally, if b2 < b < y∗, the retailer should not provide guarantee and simply order
b.
Comparing with the case without backup supply, the condition for profitable
guarantee is more tight, which means the retailer is less likely to use guarantee
when a backup supply is available. Further discussions are provided as follows.
Numerical Study
In this subsection, we use numerical study to examine the effect of bank’s risk
free rate, supplier’s initial capital and yield condition. Without further speci-
fication, the following parameters are set as base values for the numerical studies:
p = 5, v = 3, w = 3, rf = 0.4.
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We assume the supplier’s production yield follows Beta distribution, B(2, 2).
The end demand distribution faced by the retailer is Weibull(100, 2). Since the
optimal decision in the second stage is always ordering up to F−1(p−vp ), we focus
on the first stage decisions. For notational simplicity, we omit the subscript 1 in
the figures unless confusion may arise.
Figure 2.3 shows how the optimal first stage ordering quantity changes
according to different b and rf . As stated in Proposition 2.3, when rf is less
than wE[ζ] − 1, the optimal policy is always to order y∗1. When rf is higher
than vE[ζ] − 1, it is optimal to order min {b, y∗1}. In figure 2.3.a, we assume
wE[ζ]− 1 < rf < vE[ζ]− 1 and investigate the impact of supplier’s initial capital
level. Since ylb is increasing in b and y′1 is constant in b, the retailer is forced to
order at ylb for b1 < b < b2. As b further increases, loan guarantee becomes less
profitable and the retailer will just order b. When b ≥ y∗1, the retailer can order
freely as the no budget constraint case. In Figure 2.3.b, we assume b is relatively
low and consider the impact of rf . If rf is less than wE[ζ] − 1, the retailer can
order at y∗1. When 1 + rf is higher than the supplier’s marginal revenue, the
retailer needs to provide guarantee. Since y′1 is decreasing in rf while ylb is
increasing in rf , there exists critical risk free interest level above which ylb is
greater than y′. If rf further increases, offering guarantee becomes less profitable
and the retailer will only order b units.
An interesting question to the retailer is that whether a more wealthy supplier
is always preferable. Similar to the previous analysis, we focus on the situation
when rf is between (wE[ζ] − 1, vE[ζ] − 1). The results are shown in Figure
2.4, where the solid line represents retailer’s expected profit. When b < b1, it is
optimal for the retailer to order y′1 and provide corresponding guarantee. As b
increases, the guarantee cost decreases and the expected profit increases. While
for b ∈ (b1, b2), because of supplier’s loan participation constraint, ordering y′1
becomes infeasible. To align the supplier’s incentive, the retailer enlarges the
ordering quantity to ylb with one hundred percent guarantee. When b ∈ [b2, y∗1],
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Figure 2.4: Effect of supplier’s initial capital on retailer’s expected profit
offering guarantee is not profitable for the retailer. The retailer should order
b and provide no guarantee. In this case, retailer’s profit is increasing in b. In
summary, when rf ∈ (wE[ζ]− 1, vE[ζ]− 1), due to supplier’s loan participation
constraint, retailer’s profit is non-monotone in supplier’s initial capital level.
The retailer can be worse off when with a more wealthy supplier. In practice, a
wealthy supplier may be unwilling to bare a debt and take the risk of bankruptcy,
while a poor supplier might be more risky as he has few to lose.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the impact of yield variance on retailer’s optimal order-
ing quantity as well as the expected profit. The expected yield rate is fixed at 0.5,
and we vary the standard deviation. The numerical study shows that both y′1 and
y∗1 are decreasing in the yield variance. Nevertheless, the thresholds for switching
ordering policy are also changing. Figure 2.5 suggests that the threshold b1 is
increasing in yield variance while b2 is decreasing.
According to Figure 2.5.b, the retailer is better off with a low yield variance
supplier when the supplier’s initial capital is relatively low or high. While as
b is in between, a supplier with lower yield variance may require a larger
order quantity and higher guarantee level, which reduces retailer’s benefit from
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b. Impact on retailer’s profit
Figure 2.5: Effect of yield variance on retailer’s optimal order size and expected
profit
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providing guarantee. In such case, the retailer could be better off with a supplier
which has higher yield variance. Figure 2.5.b also depicts that if the retailer
chooses to order b and b is less than the optimal second stage order up to level,
then the supplier’s yield condition does not affect retailer’s overall profit.
Figure 2.6 shows the impact of the backup supplier’s wholesale price. It is
observed that both b1 and b2 are increasing in v. Therefore, the retailer is more
likely to use guarantee when facing a more expensive backup source. It is also
noticed that in Figure 2.2, b1 and b2 are decreasing in rf for rf ∈ [wE[ζ] −
1, vE[ζ] − 1]. Hence, the option of using loan guarantee and backup source are
complementary to each other. Figure 2.6.b shows both y′1 and y∗1 are increasing
in v. The results suggest that, for b ≤ b1 or b ≥ y∗1, the retailer tends to order
more from the SME supplier when the backup source is more expensive.
2.4.2 Retailer Financing with Advance Payment
Apart from using loan guarantee, the retailer can also support a budget con-
strained supplier through other financing schemes. A prevalent approach is ad-
vance payment or prepayment. Hereafter, we use the term advance payment to
refer to retailer’s payment to the supplier before order delivery.
We consider a stylized model where no other financing access is available to
the SME supplier. For an order size y1 greater than the SME’s initial capital level
b, to let the supplier have sufficient funds for production, the retailer needs to
pay y1 − b in advance. After supplier’s production yield is realized, the retailer
pays the rest amount (wy1ζ − y1 + b)+.
Similar to our discussion with loan guarantee scheme, the supplier preserves
the participation constraint. The supplier accepts the advance payment and sets
the production quantity at y1 only when the expected profit is higher than the
case without advance payment and produces b.
Supplier’s problem
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b. Impact on y′1 and y∗1
Figure 2.6: Effect of backup supply price on retailer’s first stage ordering policies
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pis =
 wy1E[ζ]− y1, if y1 ≤ bE[(wy1ζ − y1 + b)+]− b, if y1 > b
















= wE[ζ]− 1 +
∫ t
0
(1− wζ)dG(ζ) > 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that 1− wt = by1 > 0.
Therefore, with the advance payment, supplier’s profit is increasing in order
size y1. The conclusion implies that the supplier should always accept retailer’s
advance payment and produce y1.
Buyer’s problem
For the retailer, the optimal second stage decision is still ordering up to B.
Since the advance payment is paid at the first stage, the retailer would incur
additional deadweight costs such as SME’s bankruptcy cost or financial distress
cots. We denote the cost as ra which is a fraction of the advance payment, the
total cost for the retailer is then (y1−b)(1+ra). After some algebraic manipulation,
the retailer’s expected profit by the end of demand realization is expressed as:
piar (y1) = pi1(0, y1)− wy1
∫ t
0
(t− ζ)dG(ζ)− (y1 − b)ra





















It has been proven that pi1(0, y1) is concave in y1, since the second term is
also concave in y1 and the last term is linear, it can be concluded that piar (y1) is
concave in y1. Denote ya1 as {y1 | ∂∂y1pira = 0}, the following lemma characterizes
retailer’s optimal decision.
Lemma 2.9. With advance payment, retailer’s optimal decisions are:
1 if b < ya1 , order y
a
1 with advance payment y
a
1 − b;
2 if ya1 < b < y
∗
1, order b;
3 if b > y∗1, order y∗1.
In Figure 2.7, we compare the performance of advance payment and loan
guarantee schemes. Bank’s risk free rate is fixed at 0.4 and the corresponding
numerical results are denoted by the solid line. For comparison, the retailer’s
financing cost for advance payment is varied between {0, 0.2, 0.4} and the results
are represented by dashed lines. Figure 2.7.a shows retailer’s optimal first stage
order quantity under both financing schemes. Depending on supplier’s initial
capital and the financing cost, the order size with advance payment can either
be more or less than the case with loan guarantee. While with advance payment,
the retailer would not need to exaggerate the order size to keep supplier’s
incentive in line. Figure 2.7.b compares retailer’s expected profit under different
conditions. As expected, with the advance payment scheme, the retailer is better
off when the financing cost is low and supplier’s internal capital is high. It is
also observed that when retailer’s financing cost is low and the supplier has
relative high initial capital, the advance payment scheme can outperform loan
guarantee. This observation can be explained by our previous discussion that to
make the financing scheme attractive to the supplier, the retailer would not need
to exaggerate the order size under advance payment scheme.
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of advance payment and loan guarantee, rf = 0.4
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2.5 Effect of Voluntary Compliance
The previous discussion has assumed that the supplier would not produce more
than the quantity that the retailer has ordered. However, supplier’s optimal pro-
duction decision may differ with retailer’s order size. Due to the unreliable pro-
duction yield, the supplier may have incentive to launch a larger production size
to compensate the possible yield loss. For detailed discussion on supply chain
coordination issue under such setting, we refer to He and Zhang (2008), Tang
et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2013). In this section, we focus on the impact of
supplier’s initial capital level and voluntary compliance on retailer’s ordering and
guarantee decisions. We model the two echelon supply chain in a Stackelberg
setting. Besides, to focus on the implication of SME’s financial conditions, we do
not consider the option of backup sourcing.
2.5.1 Bank Loan Financing with Random Yield
In this subsection, we build the model when the supplier can only obtain bank
loan financing without retailer’s loan guarantee. The retailer, as the Stackelberg
leader, first decides the order quantity y, which is also the maximum quantity
that would be accepted upon delivery. The SME supplier, as the follower, decides
the borrowing amount and production quantity.
Since the supplier has no other investment opportunities and taking bank
loan incurs additional financing cost, the supplier should always use the internal
capital first. A bank loan will be issued only when the supplier decides to produce
more than b. Once more, the bank is assumed to be risk neutral.
No Financing Access
When there is no financing access, the supplier’s production quantity q is con-
strained by the initial capital b. After retailer’s order quantity is released, the
supplier chooses q to maximize his own interests. Supplier’s profit maximization




Πs = wE[min(qζ, y)]− q (2.9)
s.t. 0 ≤ q ≤ b
It is easy to show that supplier’s profit function is concave in q, and the optimal
q can be characterized as: qs = min{ yti , b}, or equivalently
qs(y, b) =
 y/ti, if y < btib, otherwise
where ti is defined as {t |
∫ t
0 wζg(ζ)dζ−1 = 0}, and qs denotes supplier’s optimal
responding production quantity.
As the Stackelberg leader, the retailer is aware of supplier’s initial budget
level and the best response qs. The retailer’s profit is determined by:
pir = −wE[min{qsζ, y}] + pE[min{D,min{qsζ, y}}]
Depending on supplier’s initial capital level, the retailer’s optimal ordering
decisions can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2.10. When the supplier has no financing access, pir is unimodal in y and
retailer’s optimal ordering quantities are:
1. If b < y0, any order size between [b,+∞) and qs = b,
2. if y0 ≤ b ≤ y0/ti, order y0 and qs = b,
3. if y0/ti ≤ b ≤ yi/ti, order bti and qs = b,
4. if b > yi/ti, order yi and qs = yi/ti.
The optimal ordering decisions can be characterized by Figure 2.8. When
the supplier has no financing access, the retailer’s order size is non-decreasing
in supplier’s initial capital. Figure 2.9 further shows that both supplier’s and



























Figure 2.8: Optimal order quantity without financing access
extremely poor when the SME supplier has little working capital.
Bank Financing
We now investigate the problem when the supplier can obtain loan financing from
a risk neutral bank. The supplier’s profit maximization problem is formulated as:
max
q≥0
Πs = E[min{wqζ,wy} − (q − b)+(1 + r(q))]+ −min{q, b} (2.10)
s.t. (q − b)+(1 + rf ) = E[min{min{wqζ,wy}, (q − b)+(1 + r(q))}]
(2.11)
Depending on the magnitude of q, y and b, the supplier’s profit can be classi-
fied into four situations:
1. q < y and q < b. In this case, the supplier does not take a bank loan and
the production quantity is less than retailer’s order size. The supplier’s expected
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Figure 2.9: Effect of SME’s initial capital on the expected profit without financing
access
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profit is always increasing in q.
2. q < y and q > b. The supplier’s problem is equivalent to our base model
when the retailer accepts all.
pis(y) = E[(wqζ − (q − b)(1 + r(q))]+ − b
= wE[ζ]1− (q − b)(1 + rf )− b
Supplier’s profit is increasing in q when wE[ζ] > 1 + rf , otherwise the
supplier is not willing to take a bank loan.
3. q > y and q < b. The supplier only uses the initial capital and the
production quantity is greater than retailer’s order size. This problem has been
studied in our previous discussion when the supplier has no financing access.
The supplier’s profit function is concave in q, with optimal production quantity
min{y/ti, b}.
4. q > y and q > b. Supplier’s production quantity is higher than retailer’s
acceptance level and uses bank loan. Supplier’s expected profit is determined as:
pis = E[min{wqζ,wy} − (q − b)(1 + r(q))]+ − b
where the loan interest rate r(q) is specified by Constraint 2.11.
We will then focus on the last case and derived supplier’s produc-
tion and borrowing decisions. In addition, we restrict our discussion to
the case when the supplier produces with a feasible loan, which means
that (q − b)(1 + rf ) ≤ E[min{wqζ,wy}]. Consider constraint 2.11, RHS
is increasing in r and RHS ≤ E[min{wqζ,wy}]. Therefore, as long as
(q − b)(1 + rf ) ≤ E[min{wqζ,wy}], there exists unique r which fairly price the
loan.
60
Let t1 be defined as {t | wqt = (q − b)(1 + r(q))} and t2 as {t | qt = y}. By
definition, we have t1 < t2. According to Constraint 2.11, we have (q − b)(1 +
rf ) =
∫ t1





wq(ζ − t1)g(ζ)dζ +
∫ 1
t2
























wyg(ζ)dζ − (q − b)(1 + rf )− b
By checking the second order derivative ( ∂
2
∂q2
pis = −w y2q3 g(yq ) < 0), we can
find that supplier’s expected profit is concave in q. Supplier’s optimal production
policy with bank loan and over production can be characterized by the critical
ratio tl which uniquely solves:
∫ t
0
wζg(ζ)dζ − (1 + rf ) = 0
The supplier’s optimal responses to retailer’s order are as follows.
Proposition 2.4. Given retailer’s order quantity y and supplier’s initial capital
level b, supplier’s optimal production quantity have three cases:
1: y ≤ bti, qs = y/ti;
2: bti ≤ y ≤ btl, qs = b;
3: y ≥ btl, qs = y/tl.
Proposition 2.4 shows that when retailer’s order size is low, the supplier
chooses to over produce with the optimal ratio 1/ti. If the order size falls
between [bti, btl], the supplier just produces b with the initial capital. This means
that if y ≤ btl the marginal financing cost is higher than the potential revenue
from producing more. The SME supplier would not take a bank loan in such
circumstance. Supplier’s optimal production policy differs with the no-financing
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case only if retailer’s order size is greater than btl. Other than producing b in
the no-financing case, the supplier is now willing to take a bank loan and the
resulting production quantity is y/tl.
Corollary 2.3. tl is increasing in rf .






As supplier’s borrowing cost goes higher, the supplier’s over production
ratio(1/tl) becomes lower. It is also noticed that when rf = 0, we have tl = ti.
This result implies that when the marginal cost of loan financing is the same as
the internal capital, supplier’s production decision would be identical for both
cases. This result is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958) which states that in perfect and competitive markets, firms’
financial and operational decisions are irrelevant and can be made independently.
Being aware of supplier’s initial capital level and optimal response, the retailer
chooses order quantity y to maximize the expected profit:
pir = Eζ,D[pmin{y,D, qsζ} − wmin{yqsζ}]
As shown in Proposition 2.4, depending on supplier’s initial capital and
retailer’s order size, supplier’s optimal production decision has three possible
cases. The retailer can either release a large order size to encourage the supplier
to use bank loan, or choose a small order size so that the supplier only produces
with the internal capital. By differentiating with respect to y, we can show that
pir is unimodal for each of the three ordering spaces. The proofs are as follows.
1. For y ≤ bti, as the supplier produce y/ti without bank loan, retailer’s
problem is the same as the no-financing case. The optimal order size is bti if
b < yi/ti, and yi if b ≥ yi/ti.
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2. For bti < y < btl, the supplier’s production quantity is b and the retailer’s
problem is the same to the case without financing. Therefore, pir is increasing
in y if y < y0, and decreasing in y if y > y0. Given bti < y < btl, as supplier
always chooses to produce b units, we denote retailer’s optimal decision as yb.
The optimal ordering policy is given by:
yb =







< b < y0ti
bti, if b >
y0
ti






















































Similar to case 1, since pir is concave in y, we can obtain the optimal order
quantity yl by solving the first order condition.
Although pir is unimodal in y for each of the three ordering spaces, the overall
optimal decision could fall in any of the situations which depends on supplier’s
initial capital level. To obtain the optimal order policy for any given b, we first
look at the second situation when supplier’s production quantity is fixed at b units.
Lemma 2.11. For bti < y < btl and retailer orders yb, pir is increasing in b on




It is worth noticing that for b ∈ [y0/tl, y0/ti], retailer’s optimal order quantity
is fixed at y0, as the supplier has more initial capital, the retailer takes the benefit
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of more secured supply.
Similarly, for the first case y < bti:
• for b ∈ [0, yi/ti], retailer’s optimal order size is bti and supplier’s corre-
sponding production quantity is b. Retailer’s expected profit is increasing
in b.
• for b ≥ yi/ti, retailer’s optimal order size is yi and supplier’s corresponding
production quantity is yi/ti. Retailer’s expected profit is constant in b.
Combine the conclusion in Lemma 2.11, given the order space y ∈ [0, btl],
retailer’s profit is increasing in b for b ∈ [0, yi/ti] and constant in b for
b ∈ [yi/ti,+∞).
Denote the optimal order quantity for y ∈ [0, btl] as ys where
ys =









≤ b ≤ yi/ti
yi, if b > yi/ti
On the other hand, for the third case y > btl:
• for b ∈ [0, yl/tl], retailer’s optimal order size is yl with supplier’s production
quantity yl/tl. As a result, retailer’s expected profit is constant in b.






[−w + pF¯ (bζ)]ζg(ζ)dζ + [−w + pF¯ (btl)]tlG¯(tl) ≤ 0.
Hence, retailer’s expected profit is decreasing in b.
Lemma 2.12. There exists bl such that for b ∈ [0, bl], pir(yl) > pir(ys) and for
































Figure 2.10: Optimal order quantity with bank finance
Proof: When b = y0tl , ys is equal to y0. Since y0 < yl and pir is increasing in y
for y ∈ [btl, yl], we have pir(ys) < pir(yl). When b = yltl , pir(y) is decreasing in y
for y ∈ [ys, yl]. Therefore pir(ys) > pir(yl) in this case. Since pir(ys) is increasing
in b, and pir(yl) is constant in b on [0, yl/tl], we can conclude that there exists




Proposition 2.5 and Figure 2.10 summarize retailer’s optimal ordering policy
with respect to supplier’s initial capital level.
Proposition 2.5. The retailer’s optimal order quantity depends on supplier’s initial
wealth which is specified as follow:
1. if 0 < b ≤ bl, the optimal order quantity is yl
2. if b ≥ bl, the optimal order quantity is ys.
where bl, yl and ys follow previous definitions.
In Figure 2.10, retailer’s optimal ordering decisions are represented by the
solid line. As can bee seen, when supplier’s internal capital is low, the retailer
chooses a large order size yl to let the supplier take bank loan and produce
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more than yl/tl. However, if supplier’s internal capital level is greater than bl, the
retailer strategically reduces the order size. The supplier would then produce
only with the internal capital. When supplier’s internal capital is greater than
yi/ti, the retailer orders yi which is the optimal ordering quantity in the no
budget constraint situation.
Figure 2.11 further illustrates how supplier’s and retailer’s profits are affected
by supplier’s internal capital b. Figure 2.11.(a) shows that supplier’s profit is
increasing in b for b ∈ [0, bl) and b ∈ (bl, yi/ti]. However, in Figure 2.11.a, it is
noticed that pis is not continuous at b = bl. On the other hand, retailer’s profit is
continuous in b at b = bl. This is because that when the SME supplier’s initial cap-
ital equals to bl, the retailer is indifferent between ordering ys to let the supplier
produce only with the internal capital or ordering yl to let the supplier produce
yl/tl with a positive loan amount. However, from the supplier’s perspective, a
larger order size (yl > ys) is more profitable in this situation.
Our model assumes that the retailer is fully aware of supplier’s production
and financial information. While the results in Figure 2.11 suggests that, for
certain range of supplier’s initial capital, the supplier may have incentive to
conceal the actual financial condition to gain higher profit. The conflict of
interest among supplier and retailer may lead to information distortion. In such
case, the retailer may need to offer an incentive compatible contract to avoid
information distortion.
2.5.2 Loan Guarantee with Disruption Risk
The previous discussion has focused on the situation when the retailer only de-
cides the order quantity without offering loan guarantee. However, when the
financing cost is higher than the supplier’s profit margin, the supplier is not
willing to take bank loan without positive guarantee. We now consider the prob-
lem when the supplier decides the production and borrowing quantity, and the
retailer decides the ordering and guarantee level. For tractability, we assume
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Figure 2.11: Effect of SME’s initial capital on the expected profit with bank fi-
nancing, rf = 0.2
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the supplier’s production process is subjected to random disruption. The disrup-
tion occurs with probability 1− θ and the production yield would be a fraction
α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of the production quantity. Similar to the settings with random
yield, we assume α is independent of the production size. The production yield
is expressed as:
ζ =
 1, with probability θα, with probability 1− θ
Denote the production size as q, the supplier chooses the optimal q to max-
imize the expected profit. Since the supplier has no other investment oppor-
tunities, there is no incentive for the supplier to borrow more than (q − b)+,




E[wmin{qζ, y} −min{b, q} − (q − b)+(1 + r)]+
s.t. (q − b)+(1 + rf ) = E[min{(q − b)+(1 + r), wmin{qζ, y}+ (b− q)+
+ x((q − b)+(1 + r)− wqζ − (b− q)+)+}]
Before characterizing supplier’s optimal decision with positive guarantee, we




E[wmin{qζ, y} −min{b, q} − (q − b)+(1 + r)]+
s.t. (q − b)+(1 + rf ) = E[min
{
wqζ + (b− q)+, (q − b)+(1 + r)}]
The supplier’s optimal decisions are summarized in Table 2.1. It can be
observed that the supplier’s optimal production quantity is greater than y if
the expected marginal revenue is higher than the marginal cost. The optimal
production quantity is increasing in the wholesale price w, the perfect production
probability θ, the disruption yield level α; while decreasing in bank’s risk free
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Table 2.1: Supplier’s optimal production quantity without guarantee
Range of ordering quantity
Condition y < bα bα < y < b y > b
w(1− θ)α > 1 + rf y/α y/α y/α
1 < w(1− θ)α < 1 + rf < wα y/α b y
w(1− θ)α < 1 < 1 + rf < wα y y y
1 < w(1− θ)α < wα < 1 + rf y/α b if wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf : y
w(1− θ)α < 1 and wα < 1 + rf y y if wE[ζ] < 1 + rf : b
interest rate rf .
We now consider supplier’s problem with positive loan guarantee. Since the
supplier has no incentive to produce more than y/α, the retailer’s payment to the
supplier when disruption happens is wqα. For the case wα ≥ 1 + rf , the supplier
can always fully repay the loan even disruption occurs. In such case, the loan
interest rate is fixed at rf and retailer’s guarantee does not take effects. In the
following content we focus on the situation when wα < 1 + rf and q > b. The
profit function of supplier has two possible situations:
1. If wqα > (q− b)(1 + rf ) or equivalently b < q ≤ q0 = b(1+rf )1+rf−wα , the supplier
can still fully repay the loan even disruption occurs. Therefore, the loan interest
rate is charged at rf . The supplier’s expected profit is written as :
pis(q) = wE[min{qζ, y}]− (q − b)(1 + rf )− b
Given y ≥ q0, if wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf , the supplier’s profit is increasing in
q on [b, q0]; otherwise, supplier’s profit is decreasing and the supplier is
not willing to borrow. In addition, when the supplier produces q0, we have
pis(x, q0) = wE[ζ]b− b+ (wE[ζ]− (1 + rf ))(q0 − b). Consequently pis(x, q0) is less
than pis(b) = wE[ζ]b− b if wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf .
2. If wqα < (q−b)(1+rf ), or equivalently q > q0 > b, the supplier cannot fully
repay the loan when disruption happens. The bank will then increase the interest
rate to compensate the potential loss under disruption. Under the risk neutral
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assumption, the loan interest rate is determined by the following equation:
(q − b)(1 + rf ) =θ(q − b)(1 + r) + (1− θ)(1− x)wqα+
x(1− θ)(q − b)(1 + r)
Consequently r = (q−b)(1+rf )−wqα(1−θ)(1−x)(q−b)(θ+x−θx) − 1.
It can also be shown that r is increasing in q. The supplier’s profit is written
as:
pis(q) = θwmin{q, y} − θ(q − b)(1 + r)− b (2.12)
= θ(wmin{q, y} − qrx) + θb(1 + rf )




Lemma 2.13. Given 1 + rf > wα and x < 1, rx > rf .
Similar to the problem with random yield assumption, in case wE[ζ] < 1+rf ,
even a guarantee is provided, the supplier is not always better off to take a bank
loan. Given an order size y, for b < q < q0, the supplier’s marginal revenue wE[ζ]
is less than the marginal cost 1 + rf . While for q0 < q < y, the supplier’s profit is
increasing in the production size if w > 1 + rx.
Lemma 2.14. Given rf > wE[ζ]− 1, the supplier is willing to take bank loan only
if w > 1 + rx and y > y, where y =
b[wE[ζ]/θ−(1+rf )/(θ+x−θx)]
w−1−rx . In addition, y is
decreasing in x, and y > q0.
The supplier’s optimal production quantities with positive guarantee are
summarized in Table 2.2. Comparing with the no guarantee case, it can be found
that loan guarantee changes supplier’s optimal production decision only for
the situation wE[ζ] < 1 + rf and y > b. Under such conditions, the supplier’s
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Table 2.2: Supplier’s optimal production quantity with guarantee
Range of ordering quantity
Condition y < bα bα < y < b y > b
w(1− θ)α > 1 + rf y/α y/α y/α
1 < w(1− θ)α < 1 + rf < wα y/α b y
w(1− θ)α < 1 < 1 + rf < wα y y y
1 < w(1− θ)α < wα < 1 + rf y/α b if wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf : y,
w(1− θ)α < 1 and wα < 1 + rf y y if wE[ζ] < 1 + rf : b for
b < y < y, y for y ≥ y
optimal production size is equal to y when w > 1 + rx and y ≥ y. If either of
the two conditions does not hold, the supplier is not willing to borrow and the
production size is b.
It is also observed that a positive guarantee would not induce the supplier
to launch a production size greater than buyer’s ordering quantity. That is to
say, if supplier’s optimal production quantity without guarantee is no more than
retailer’s ordering quantity, then supplier’s optimal production quantity with guar-
antee is also no more than y. This observation implies that under no circumstance
the retailer would share supplier’s over production cost.
The reason is that the loan interest rate is no less than rf even with positive
guarantee. If the supplier’s marginal revenue with over production, namely
w(1 − θ)α, is less than 1 + rf , then the supplier’s marginal borrowing cost is
always higher than the marginal revenue from over production. Thus, when
w(1− θ)α < 1 + rf , the supplier would not produce more than y.
We focus on the case wα < 1+rf , the supplier’s profit with optimal production
size is expressed as:
pis =

w(θ + α− θα)y − y, if 0 < y < b
w(θ + α− θα)b− b, if b ≤ y ≤ ylb
θ[wy − (y − b)(1 + r)]− b, if y > y
Buyer’s problem
71
Denote the supplier’s optimal production quantity as qs, as the Stackelberg
leader, the retailer’s expected profit is written as:
pir(x, y) = θ[pmin{y, qs, D}−wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{y, qsα,D}−wqsα−x((qs−
b)+(1 + r)− wqsα)+]




θ[pmin{y,D} − wy, when qs = y/α
θ[pmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{bα,D} − wbα], when qs = b > y
θ[pmin{b,D} − wb] + (1− θ)[pmin{bα,D} − wbα], when qs = b ≤ y
θ[pmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{yα,D} − wyα
−x((y − b)(1 + r)− wyα)+],
when qs = y
As can be seen, the retailer’s guarantee cost is positive only when qs = y and
x(1− θ))(y − b)(1 + r)−wyα) > 0. We first look for the optimal guarantee level
in such situation.
Lemma 2.15. For wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf , given that the supplier decides to produce y and
(y − b)(1 + r) > wyα, retailer’s profit is decreasing in x. For wE[ζ] < 1 + rf and
y > ylb, there exists x(y) ∈ [0, 1] such that:
1. if x ∈ [x(y), 1], supplier’s optimal production decision qs is y and retailer’s profit
pir is decreasing in x;
2. if x ∈ [0, x(y)], qs = b and pir is constant in x,
where ylb = y(1) and x(y) =
θ(y−b)(1+rf−wE[ζ])
w(1−θ)(yθ−yαθ−bα−bθ+bαθ) .
Similar to the random yield problem, we use ylb to denote y(1). For wE[ζ] <
1 + rf , if the ordering quantity is between [b, ylb], the supplier is not going to
take bank loan even if full guarantee is provided. From the retailer’s perspective,
the benefit of guarantee is that the supplier is willing to increase the production
quantity from b to y, in case wE[ζ] < 1 + rf and y ≥ ylb. Lemma 2.15 indi-
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cates that the retailer has no incentive to offer extra guarantee. For a desired
production production quantity, the retailer either offers zero guarantee(when
wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf ), or the minimum guarantee x(y)(when wE[ζ] < 1 + rf ).
For wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf , supplier’s optimal production quantity is no less than y.
Furthermore, a loan guarantee does not change supplier’s decision in such case.
Henceforth, we focus on the situation when wE[ζ] < 1 + rf .
As the Stackelberg leader, the retailer correctly anticipates supplier’s pro-
duction decision. Since supplier’s best response qs is a deterministic function
of guarantee and order quantity, we will then consider retailer’s problem. In
addition, according to Lemma 2.15, retailer’s optimal guarantee level is either 0
or x(y). Given wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , with optimally decided guarantee decision, the
retailer’s profit function has two possible situations which depends on supplier’s
marginal revenue with over production:




θ[pmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{yα,D} − wyα], if 0 < y ≤ b
θ[pmin{b,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{bα,D} − wbα], if b < y ≤ ylb
θ[pmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{yα,D} − wyα]
−(y − b)(1 + rf − wE[ζ]),
if y ≥ ylb
Denote y0 as the solution to θ(pF¯ (y)−w) +α(1− θ)(pF¯ (yα)−w) = 0, which
represents the optimal order quantity with disruption risk but without budget
constraint. Denote y′ as the solution to θ(pF¯ (y)− w) + α(1− θ)(pF¯ (yα)− w)−
(1 + rf − wE[ζ]) = 0, which represents the optimal order quantity with both
disruption risk and positive guarantee cost.
Proposition 2.6. Give rf > wE[ζ]−1 and w(1−θ)α < 1, define b1 = {b | ylb(b) =
y′} and b2 = {b | pir(x, ylb(b)}) = pir(0, b)}. The retailer’s optimal decisions are:
(1). If 0 < b < b1, order y′ with guarantee x(y′);
(2). if b1 < b < b2, order ylb(b) with guarantee x(ylb(b));
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(3). if b2 < b < y0, order b and provide no guarantee;
(4). if b ≥ y0, order y0 and provide no guarantee;
Proposition 2.6 describes retailer’s decisions when the supplier has no
inventive to produce more than y. The retailer’s optimal policy has the same
structure as the random yield problem with forced compliance. To encourage the
supplier produces more, the retailer needs to share the financing cost through
loan guarantee. Furthermore, offering guarantee is profitable for the retailer
when the supplier has few working capital. When supplier’s initial capital is
higher than certain threshold, it is optimal for the retailer to order the minimum
of b and y0, and provides zero guarantee.
Case 2 : When w(1− θ)α > 1, the retailer’s expected profit is
pir =

θ[pmin{y,D} − wy, if 0 < y < bα
θ[pmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{bα,D} − wbα], if bα ≤ y ≤ b
θ[pmin{b,D} − wb] + (1− θ)[pmin{bα,D} − wbα], if b < y < ylb
θ[pmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{yα,D} − wyα]
−(y − b)(1 + rf − wE[ζ]),
if y ≥ ylb
In this case, supplier’s marginal revenue with over production is greater than
1. When retailer’s order quantity y is less than supplier’s initial budget, the sup-
plier’s optimal production quantity would be higher than y. While for order
quantity more than b, the supplier’s production quantity is no more than y.
Denote ya = F−1(p−wp ) as the traditional newsvendor optimal ordering
quantity without disruption risk and budget constraint.
Proposition 2.7. Given rf > wE[ζ] − 1 and w(1 − θ)α > 1, define b1 = {b |
ylb(b) = y
′} and b2 = {b | pir(x,max{y′, ylb(b)}) = pir(0,min{b, ya})}. The
retailer’s optimal decisions are:
(1). If b1 ≤ b2, order y′ with guarantee x(y′) for b ∈ [0, b1]; order ylb(b) with
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b. Retailer’s expected profit
Figure 2.12: Comparison of different compliance scheme
guarantee x(ylb(b)) for b ∈ (b1, b2]; order min{b, ya} with no guarantee for
b ∈ (b2,+∞).
(2). If b1 > b2, order y′ with guarantee x(y′) for b ∈ [0, b2]; order min{b, ya} with
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no guarantee for b ∈ (b2,+∞).
Figure 2.12 illustrates the results in Proposition 2.6 and Proposition 2.7. The
supplier’s expected yield is fixed at 0.5. We use R and S to denote whether the
production quantity is determined by the retailer or the supplier. As discussed
above, when the supplier has no inventive to over produce, the outcome of the
two situations are the same. In Figure 2.12 , this situation is shown by the
solid line where θ = 0.2 and α = 0.375 and denoted as R/S. However, if 1 <
w(1 − θ)α < 1 + rf and y < b, the supplier is willing to produce more than y
using the internal capital. In Figure 2.12, this situation is denoted by the dashed
line. For comparison, we also show the case when the supplier produces exactly
what retailer orders, which is represented by dash-dot line in Figure 2.12.
For b > ya, the retailer is better off when the supplier decides to produce more
than the order quantity. This is due to the fact that when the supplier produces
more, the retailer has a more reliable supply process. Given rf > wE[ζ] − 1
and α < 1, we have ya ≤ y0. Combing the results in Proposition 2.7, when
the supplier chooses to overproduce, the retailer correctly anticipates supplier’s
decision and chooses a lower ordering quantity. Comparing with the case of
forced compliance, the retailer is better off while the supplier would be worse
off. This result reveals that the supplier may not be better off under voluntary
compliance.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Research
Many SME suppliers are having difficulties in obtaining sufficient working capital.
The suppliers’ financial inability also affects the profitability of their supply chain
partners. In this study, we consider an SME supplier which is of limited working
capital and unreliable production process. We investigate the options of using
bank loan financing, retailer’s loan guarantee, and retailer’s advance payment.
An analytical model is built to study retailer’s optimal ordering and guarantee
decisions with consideration of supplier, retailer and bank’s incentives.
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Under forced compliance, the result shows that loan guarantee scheme does
reduce supplier’s financing cost. While the retailer should offer guarantee only
when the borrowing cost is higher than supplier’s potential revenue. Otherwise,
the retailer should not share supplier’s financing cost and retailer’s profit can be
maximized by simply chosen the optimal order quantity. When the financing cost
is high, the retailer is especially better off by providing guarantee when supplier’s
initial capital is low. As supplier’s initial capital increases, the profit improvement
by loan guarantee diminishes. It is also observed that, when supplier’s initial
capital is greater than certain threshold, the retailer needs to increase the order
size and provide positive guarantee at the same time to keep supplier’s interest
aligned.
To secure the sourcing process, some companies choose to use backup supply.
We further extend our base model to incorporate a perfectly reliable but more
expensive backup supplier. It is found that as the wholesale price of backup supply
increases, the retailer is more likely to use loan guarantee and orders more from
the unreliable SME supplier.
In addition, we study the problem of voluntary compliance where the produc-
tion quantity is decided by the supplier. Firstly, when the supply process is subject
to random yield and the supplier can take bank loan financing, we show that
there exists a threshold for the supplier’s initial capital below which the retailer
chooses a large order size, and the supplier is then willing to take a bank loan
and produce more. When supplier’s initial capital is higher than this threshold,
the retailer chooses a smaller order size such that the supplier produces only
with the initial capital. The numerical results show that retailer’s profit is non-
decreasing in supplier’s initial capital. Both the supplier and the retailer achieve
highest profit when the supplier has abundant capital. However, the supplier
can be worse off when b is relatively high. This result suggests the supplier may
have incentive to hide the actual financial status. In practice, a retailer may have
information on the reliability of supplier’s production process. But it is unlikely
for the retailer to be able to monitor the supplier’s financial conditions accurately.
On the other hand, as a financial institute, the bank has more speciality on how
to evaluate company’s financial state. This observation addresses that successful
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implementation of supply chain financing needs the cooperation among financial
institutes and supply chain partners.
Finally, we consider the loan guarantee decision with voluntary compliance.
The supplier is assumed to have disruption risk. We show that with optimally
decided guarantee, the retailer is not going to share supplier’s over production
risk. In addition, when overproduction is profitable for the supplier, the retailer
takes advantage of more reliable supply and strategically reduces the order size.
This study contributes to the research of joint interface of supply chain
management and finance. Our work confirms that the retailer could be better off
by helping the SME supplier reduce financing cost. Our results also point out that
retailer’s financing support needs to be coordinated with the order decision and
supplier’s financial condition. Otherwise, the supplier would be lack of incentives
to participate in the financing program.
Although various types of contracts are being used in practice, due to its sim-
plicity and convenience for execution, wholesale price contract is the most widely
adopted and studied. The discussion of other types of contracts are beyond the
scope of this study. A potential extension of this work would be incorporating
different contract types to align supply chain members’ incentives. Another impor-
tant research question remains unsolved is that when both production reliability
and initial financial status are private information to the supplier, how should the
retailer design a proper contract to make supplier’s incentive align. This question,
as well as other possible extensions are left for future research.
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Appendix A
Proofs in Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.2 :
Define H(x, ρ) = θ(f) + ω(p)− ρ(η(r) + θ(f)) and K(x) = θ(f)+ω(p)θ(f)+η(r) , where
x = (r, f, p). It is obvious that E[Π(x)] is differentiable for both H(x, B) < 0
and H(x, B) > 0. The only thing needs to be proven is E[Π(x)] is differentiable
at H(x, B) = 0. Let x0 = {x | H(x, B) = 0}, it can be shown that the partial
derivatives at x0 exist and are continuous.
Denote ∆ as a vector such that H(x0 + ∆, B) > 0 and H(x0 −∆, B) < 0.
Consider the special case where ∆i = tei = (0, ..., t, ..., 0) , i ∈ {r, f, p}. Taking
∆r as an example:



























tH ′r(x0, ρ)g(ρ)dρ+ o(t) + (K(x0)−K(x0 −∆r))H(x0, ξ)
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=− η(r0)− η′r(r0)(r0 + d) + (c− cr)η′r(r0)µ
The last equality comes from the fact taht K(x0) = B. It is easy to show that
lim
|∆r|→0
E[Π(x0 + ∆r)]− E[Π(x0)]
| ∆r |
=− η(r0)− η′r(r0)(r0 + d) + (c− cr)η′r(r0)µ
Similarly, it can be obtained that the partial derivatives exist and are continu-
ous with respect to f and p. Hence E[Π(x)] is differentiable at x0.
Poof of Proposition 1.2 :
It is easy to show that E[Π(r, f, p)] is concave for the case (θ + η)B ≤ θ + ω.
We will then look at the situation when (θ + η)A ≤ θ + ω ≤ (θ + η)B. To show
the concavity, we need to have E[−Π(r, f, p)] is convex in r, f and p. Applying















































, x = β(ω+θ)η+θ , and y =
γ(η−ω)
η+θ . Since c > cr,
it’s straightforward that C ≥ 0. It can be obtained that: H1 = 2β + Cx2 > 0,
H2 = 4βγ+2Cβy
2+2Cγx2 > 0, andH3 = 4Cby2β+4Cbx2γ+8bβγ+4Cb2βγ > 0.
Therefore, the expected profit function is concave on (θ+ η)B ≤ θ+ω. Combing
Lemma 1.2, it can be concluded that E[Π(r, f, p)] is concave.
Proof of corollary 1.2 :
Denote the optimal pricing decisions as (r∗1, f∗1 , p∗1) and (r∗2, f∗2 , p∗2) for yield
distribution ρ1 and ρ2 respectively. By definition, we have E[Π(r∗2, f∗2 , p∗2 | ρ2)] ≥














(θ + ω − x(θ + η))φ1(x)dx
)




(Φ1(x)− Φ2(x))dx ≥ 0,
The last equality comes from the fact that
∫ k
A(x − k)φ(x)dx = (x − k)Φ(x)|kA −∫ k
A Φ(x)dx = −
∫ k






2 | ρ2)] ≥ E[Π(r∗1, f∗1 , p∗1 |
ρ1)] and Corollary 1.2 follows.
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Appendix B
Proofs in Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1:





0 wyζg (ζ) dζ ≤
∫ (y−b)(1+r)
wy
0 (y − b)(1 + r)g (ζ) dζ, we
can obtain RHS (r) ≤ x(y − b) (1 + r) + (1− x) (y − b) (1 + r) = (y − b) (1 + r).
Therefore, to meet bank’s return requirement, the loan interest rate r is no less
than rf .
Part c and d, proofs are omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2.3 :





(y − b)(1 + rf ). By taking partial derivative, it can be obtained that:






tdG(t)]− (1 + rf ) = − b
y
(1 + rf ) < 0







Frf = −(y − b) < 0
Ft = xwy + (1− x)wy(1−G(t)) > 0
Fb = 1 + rf > 0
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Therefore ∂t∂x = −FxFt = −
t−[∫ t0 ζdG(ζ)+∫ 1t tdG(tζ)]
x+(1−x)(1−G(t)) < 0,
∂t
∂b = −FbFt < 0,
∂t




Proof of Lemma 2.4 :
The conclusion can be proven by checking the first order partial derivative:
∂pis
∂x = −wy1G¯(t) ∂t∂x > 0, and similarly ∂pis∂rf = wyG¯(t) ∂t∂rf < 0.





(wyζ − (y − b)(1 + r))g(ζ)dζ, we can obtain ∂pis∂r =
−(y − b)G¯( (y−b)(1+r)wy ) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Combine Equation 2.5 and Lemma 2.4, it is straightforward that for any order
size greater than b, if wE[ζ] ≥ 1 + rf , we have pis(y) ≥ pis(b), ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
When wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , as Equation 2.5 shows, the supplier is not willing
to borrow if x = 0. Consider r as a function of rf , x, and y, according
to Lemma 2.4, the minimum guarantee level for the supplier to be willing
to borrow is x such that r(rf , x, y) = rb(wE[ζ], 0, y). On the other hand, as
stated in Lemma 2.1, r(rf , x, y) ≤ r(rf , 1, y) = rf = rb(wE[ζ], 0, ylb), where
the last equality comes from the definition of ylb. Consequently ∀y ∈ [b, ylb),
r(rf , x, y) > rf ≥ rb(wE[ζ], 0, y), and pis(rf , x, y) < pis(b) even if a 100%
guarantee is provided by the retailer. Therefore, Proposition 2.1 is proved.
Proof of Corollary 2.1:


























(y−b)2G¯(tb) < 0, where the last equality is obtained by

















G¯(tb)(y−b)2 > 0, hence x is decreasing in y.
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Since tb is irrelevant of rf and w, it’s straightforward that x is increasing in
rf and decreasing in w.
Proof of Corollary 2.2 :
Since ylb is defined as: (ylb − b)wE[ζ] = wylb
∫ (ylb−b)(1+rf )wylb
0 ζdG(ζ) + (ylb −
b)(1 + rf )G¯(
(ylb−b)(1+rf )
wylb
), we can obtain ∂ylb(b)∂b =
ylb
b > 0. Similarly, it can be
shown that ylb is increasing in rf and decreasing in w.
Proof of Lemma 2.6:
For y ≤ b, retailer’s profit is constant in x. We then look at the case y > b.
















Therefore, retailer’s profit is decreasing in the guarantee level x.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 : We first look at the relaxation problem where x can
be greater than 1. The retailer’s profit(denoted by pipr ) with optimal guarantee x
becomes:
pipr =
 pir(0, y), if 0 < y ≤ bpir(0, y)− (y − b)(1 + rf − wE[ζ]), if y > b
It can be verified that the retailer’s profit is continuous for the relaxation
problem. For the original problem, the retailer’s profit is constant in y for y ∈
[b, ylb]. Denote yA = arg max
0≤y≤b
{pir(0, y)} and yB = arg max
y≥b
{pir(0, y)− (y− b)(1 +
rf − wE[ζ])}.
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The necessary condition for the retailer to be willing to provide positive
guarantee is that there exists yB ∈ [b,+∞) such that pir(0, yB)− (yB−b)(1+rf −
wE[ζ]) > pir(0, yA).
For the first situation(rf ≤ wE[ζ]− 1 or b ≥ y∗), the result is straightforward
from Lemma 2.6 and Proposition 2.1. For the second situation(rf > wE[ζ] − 1
and b < y∗), we discuss the following three cases:
part a: From the definition of b1, for b < b1 we have ylb(b) < y′. Hence,
yB = y
′ and x(y′) ≤ 1.
Since rf > wE[ζ]− 1, y′ < y∗. The retailer’s profit is increasing on [0, b] and
yA = b. We can obtain that pir(x(y′), y′) > pir(0, b) by considering the relaxation
problem. Hence, retailer’s profit is unimodal and the optimal ordering quantity
is y′.
part b and c: We divide the proof into two cases, b1 < b ≤ y′ and y′ < b < y∗.
For b1 < b < y′: When b = b1, ylb(b1) = y′, as part a shows, we have pir(0, y′)−
(y′ − b1)(1 + rf −wE[ζ]) > pir(0, b1). When b = y′, we have pir(0, ylb(y′))− (ylb −
y′)(1 + rf − wE[ζ]) < pir(0, y′).
Both pir(0, b) and pir(x, ylb(b)) are continuous in b. Obviously, there exists
b2 ∈ (b1, y′) such that pir(x, ylb(b2)) = pir(0, ylb(b2)) − (ylb(b2) − b2)(1 + rf −
wE[ζ]) = pir(0, b2).
We then show that b2 is unique. When the retailer offers positive guaran-






0 (pF¯ (ylbζ)−w)ζg(ζ)dζ−(∂ylb∂b −1)(1+rf−wE[ζ]) = ∂ylb∂b [
∫ 1
0 (pF¯ (ylbζ))ζg(ζ)dζ−
(1 + rf )] + 1 + rf − wE[ζ].
Since b > b1, we have ylb(b) > y′ and
∫ 1
0 (pF¯ (ylbζ))ζg(ζ)dζ − (1 + rf ) < 0.
According to Corollary 2.2, ∂ylb∂b is positive. Therefore
∂pir(x,ylb(b))
∂b < 1+rf−wE[ζ].
When the buyer does not provide guarantee, since b < y′ < y∗, the maximum




0 pζF¯ (bζ)g(ζ)dζ − wE[ζ]. Since b < y′,
it can be obtained that ∂pir(0,b)∂b > 1 + rf − wE[ζ].
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Therefore for b > b1, we have
∂pir(0,b)
∂b > 1 + rf − wE[ζ] > ∂pir(x,ylb(b))∂b ,
consequently pir(0, b) > pir(x, ylb(b)) is true ∀b > b2. Hence, there is unique b2.
Secondly, when y′ < b < y∗, pir(0, b) > pir(0, y′) > pir(x, ylb(b)). Combine the
results in the previous discussion, for b2 < b < y∗, the retailer should not provide
guarantee, and the optimal ordering quantity is b.
Proof of Lemma 2.8 :
We prove the lemma by showing that the retailer’s profit is always decreasing
in y1 when w > v. Denote pir(x, y1) as the retailer’s first stage expected profit.










































When wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , buyer’s guarantee is needed. For y1 < B,
∂
∂y1








ζdG(ζ) < 0. Hence, we can conclude that for w > v, the
retailer should not order from the unreliable SME supplier.
Proof of Proposition 2.3 :
The proof for case 1 is omitted.
For case 2: Since b < y∗1, it is straightforward that the retailer’s profit is




Since rf > vE[ζ]−1, if y1 < B, we have ∂∂y1pi
p
r (y1) = vE[ζ]−1−rf < 0; if y1 > B,
∂
∂y1







ζdG(ζ) < 0. Therefore, for any
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first stage order size greater than b, pir(x, y1) < pir(0, b). Hence the optimal first
stage order size is b.
For case 3: We first state the relations B < y′1 < y∗1. Depending on the value
of b, We classify the discussion into 6 possible situations. b < ylb < B < y′,
b < B < ylb < y
′, b < B < y′ < ylb, B < b < ylb < y′, B < b < y′ < ylb, and
B < y′ < b < ylb.
For the first situation, the profit function of the retailer is
pir(y1) =

(v − w)y1E[ζ]− vB + E[pmin{B,D}], if 0 < y1 ≤ b
(v − w)bE[ζ]− vB + E[pmin{B,D}], if b < y1 ≤ ylb
(vE[ζ]− 1− rf )y1 − vB + b(1 + rf − wE[ζ])
+E[pmin{B,D}],
if ylb < y1 ≤ B
(b− y1)(1 + rf )− wbE[ζ]
+E[pmin{max{B, y1ζ}, D} − v(B − y1ζ)+],
if y1 > B
To preserve continuity, consider the auxiliary problem, where for b < y1 < ylb,





(v − w)E[ζ], if 0 < y1 ≤ b
vE[ζ]− 1− rf , if b < y1 ≤ ylb




pF¯ (y1ζ)ζdG(ζ)− 1− rf , if y1 > B
Therefore, the pipr is unimodal, and the optimal ordering quantity is y′1. Since
pir(y1) is different from pi
p
r (y1) only when y1 ∈ (b, ylb) and pir(y1) = pir(b) in
such case, we can conclude that y′1 is also the optimal solution for the original
problem. For the other five situations, the proof is similar to this situation and
the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof of Lemma 2.10
Depending on supplier’s responding decision, retailer’s profit has the two
following situations.
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1. For y ≤ bti,





















































It can be seen that pir is concave in y. Denote yi as the ordering quantity
which satisfies the first order condition. For the order space [0, bti]: if yi < bti, pir
is increasing on [0, yi] and decreasing on [yi, bti]; if yi > bti, pir is increasing on
[0, bti]. Therefore, for 0 < y ≤ bti, retailer’s optimal order quantity is min{yi, bti}.
2. For y > bti
pir = −wE[min{bζ, y}] + E[pmin{D,min{bζ, y}}]
Further,
pir =
 −wE[min{bζ, y}] + pE[min{D,min{bζ, y}}] if bti ≤ y ≤ b,−wbE[ζ] + pE[min{D, bζ}] if y ≥ b.
For y > b, pir is constant in y and equals to the case of accepting all supplier’s











































Let y0 denote the solution to pF¯ (y)− w = 0. The value of y0 is also retailer’s
optimal order quantity when the supplier is with perfect yield and sufficient
capital. By the definition of yi, it can be concluded that yi ≥ y0, which shows that
when the supplier has sufficient capital, the retailer needs to increase the order
size if the yield is random.
Since bti ≤ y ≤ b, it is obvious that G¯(yb ) ≥ 0. The first order derivative
∂pir(y)
∂y = [−w + pF¯ (y)]G¯(yb ) is non-negative for y ≤ y0 and non-positive for y ≥
y0. Therefore, retailer’s expected profit is unimodal in this case(not necessarily
concave).
For the case y ≥ bti, depending on the magnitude of y0 and b, there are
following possible situations: if y0 < bti, pir is decreasing for y ∈ [bti, b], and
constant for y ∈ [b,∞); if bti < y0 < b, pir is increasing for y ∈ [bti, y0], decreasing
for y ∈ [y0, b] and constant for y ∈ [b,+∞); if y0 > b, pir is increasing for y ∈ [bti, b]
and constant on y ∈ [b,∞). The optimal order decision for y > bti is then:
y =

b, if b < y0
y0, if y0 < b <
yi
ti
bti, if b >
yi
ti
Combine the discussions for the two situations, we can conclude that pir is
unimodal in y. The optimal ordering decisions are summarized in Lemma 2.10
and Figure 2.8.
Poof of Lemma 2.11:






0 [−w + pF¯ (bζ)]ζg(ζ)dζ + [−w + pF¯ (btl)]tlG¯(tl).
Since
∫ tl
0 [−w + pF¯ (yltl ζ)]
ζ
tl




we can obtain ∂pir2(btl)∂b ≥ 0.
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part b. For y0tl < b <
y0
ti




0 [−w + pF¯ (bζ)]ζg(ζ)dζ.
Since bζ < y0 and −w + pF¯ (y0) = 0 , we have ∂pir2(y0)∂b ≥ 0.
part c. For y0ti ≤ b ≤
yi
ti




0 [−w + pF¯ (bζ)]ζg(ζ)dζ + [−w + pF¯ (bti)]tiG¯(ti)
Since
∫ ti
0 [−w + pF¯ (yiti ζ)]
ζ
ti
g(ζ)dζ + [−w + pF¯ (yi)]G¯(ti) = 0 and b ≤ yiti , we
can obtain ∂pir2(bti)∂b ≥ 0.




0 [−w + pF¯ (bζ)]ζg(ζ)dζ + [−w + pF¯ (bti)]tiG¯(ti) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.13 :
It can be obtained that rx − rf = (1−x)(1−θ)(1+rf−wα)x+θ−xθ . Since x < 1 and
1 + rf > wα, we have rx > rf .
Proof of Lemma 2.14 :
By definition, we have ∂∂xy =
−wbα(1−θ)(1+rf−wE[ζ]
θ(1+rf−w(x+α−xα+(−1+x)(−1+α)θ))2 < 0,
which shows y is decreasing in x. It can be obtained that y(1) − q0 =
bwα(1+rf−wE[ζ]
(w−1−rf )(1+rf−wα)θ > 0. Therefore y(x) > y(1) > q0.
Since wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , the supplier’s profit is decreasing in q for q ∈ [b, q0] and
pis(x, q0) < wE[ζ]b−b = pis(b). On the other hand, since w > 1+rx, the supplier’s
profit is increasing in q for q ∈ (q0, y]. According to Equation 2.12, we have
pis(x, y) = θwy − θ(y − b)(1 + r) − b = wE[ζ]b − b = pis(x, b). Therefore, when
wE[ζ] < 1 + rf , the supplier is willing to take bank loan only when w > 1 + rx
and y ≥ y.
Proof of Lemma 2.15 :
According to Lemma 2.14 y is decreasing in x, therefore, for y > ylb = y(1),
the supplier’s optimal production quantity is y when x = 1. Since wE[ζ] < 1 + rf ,
we can also obtain that supplier’s optimal production quantity is b when x = 0.





Therefore there exists unique x such that the supplier is willing to produce y
when buyer’s guarantee is no less than x.
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For qs = b, the supplier does not take bank loan and the retailer’s profit is
not affected by x. When qs = y, since wE[ζ] < 1 + rf and y ≥ ylb > q0, we
have (y − b)(1 + r)− wyα > 0. When disruption occurs, the retailer’s additional
payment to the banks is: x(1− θ)[(y − b)(1 + r)− wyα] = (1−θ)[(y−b)(1+rf )−wyα]1−θ+θ/x .
Since ∂∂xpir = −
θ(1−θ)[(1+rf )(y−b)−wyα]
(x+θ−xθ)2 < 0, the retailer’s expected profit is
decreasing in x in such case.
Proof of Proposition 2.6 :
Consider the auxiliary profit function pipr (y) where
pipr =

θ[pEmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{yα,D} − wyα], if 0 < y < b
θ[pEmin{y,D} − wy] + (1− θ)[pmin{yα,D} − wyα]
−(y − b)(1 + rf − wE[ζ]),
if y ≥ b
For 0 ≤ b ≤ b1, pipr is maximized at y′. Since ylb is increasing in b, we have
y′ ≥ ylb for b ≤ b1. Therefore, the optimal order quantity for the original problem
is also y′.
For b1 < b < y′, pir is increasing in y between [0, b], constant between [b, ylb]
and decreasing between [ylb,+∞). Retailer’s optimal order quantity is either b
or ylb, where pir(b) = θ[pmin{b,D} − wb] + (1 − θ)[pmin{bα,D} − wbα] and
pir(ylb) = θ[pmin{ylb, D} −wylb] + (1− θ)[pmin{ylbα,D} −wylbα]− (ylb − b)(1 +
rf − wE[ζ]). Consider pir(b) and pir(ylb(b)) as functions of b, it is easy to verify
that both functions are continuous in b.
When b = b1, for the auxiliary problem, pi
p
r (y) is increasing in y for y ∈ [0, b1]
and y ∈ [b1, ylb(b1)], but decreasing in y for y ∈ [ylb(b1),+∞). Hence, for the
original problem we have pir(b) |b=b1< pir(ylb(b)) |b=b1 . Similarly, when b = y′,
pipr is increasing on [0, y′], decreasing on [y′, ylb(y′)] and [ylb(y′),+∞). Hence,
pir(b) |b=y′> pir(ylb(b)) |b=y′ . By continuity, there exists b2 ∈ [b1, y′] such that
pir(b) |b=b2= pir(ylb(b)) |b=b2 . We show b2 is unique by comparing the first order
partial derivative of pir(b) and pir(ylb(b)).
∂
∂bpir(b) = θ(pF¯ (b)− w) + α(1− θ)(pF¯ (bα)− w).
For b < y′, ∂∂bpir(b) > θ(pF¯ (y
′)−w)+α(1−θ)(pF¯ (y′α)−w) = 1+rf −wE[ζ].
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∂
∂bpir(ylb(b)) = {θ(pF¯ (ylb)−w)+α(1−θ)(pF¯ (ylbα)−w)−1−rf+wE[ζ]}∂ylb(b)∂b +
1 + rf − wE[ζ].
For b > b1, we have ylb(b) > y′. Combing the fact
∂ylb(b)
∂b > 0, it can be
obtained that ∂∂bpir(ylb(b)) <
∂
∂bpir(b).
Therefore, pir(b) and pir(ylb(b) have unique intersection at b2 and b2 ∈ [b1, y′].
For b1 ≤ b < b2, pir(b) < pir(ylb(b)); for b2 < b ≤ y′, pir(b) > pir(ylb(b)).
For y′ < b ≤ y0, pipr is increasing on [0, b], decreasing on [b,+∞). Therefore
pir(b) > pir(ylb(b)), the optimal order quantity is b.
For b > y0, pipr is increasing on [0, ya], decreasing on [ya,+∞). The optimal
quantity is then ya.
Proof of Proposition 2.7 :
Suppose the retailer lets supplier produce more than b, namely y ≥ ylb and
x > x, as previous results shows, the optimal order quantity is the minimum
of y′ and ylb. While for the ordering range y < b, the optimal order level is the
maximum of b and ya. Therefore the retailer optimal decisions can be obtained
by comparing the value of pir(x,max{y′, ylb}) and pir(0,min{b, ya}). Depending
on the value of y′ and ya, there are two possible cases.
First y′ ≤ ya: By definition, we have b1 < y′. For b ≤ b1, it is obvious that
retailer’s profit is maximized at y = y′ and x = x(y′). For b > y′, since ylb |b=y′> y′,
retailer’s optimal decision is then order min{b, ya} without guarantee. Therefore,
there exists b2 ∈ (b1, y′) such that pir(x, ylb(b)) = pir(0, b). Since ∂∂bpir(x, ylb(b)) =
{θ(pF¯ (ylb) − w) + α(1 − θ)(pF¯ (αylb) − w) − 1 − rf + wE[ζ]}∂ylb(b)∂b + 1 + rf −
wE[ζ] < 1 + rf −wE[ζ], and ∂∂bpir(b) > θ(pF¯ (y′)−w) +α(1− θ)(pF¯ (y′α)−w) =
1 + rf − wE[ζ], b2 is unique.
The second case y′ > ya: For b = 0, it is optimal for the retailer to order y = y′
and provide guarantee x(y′).
For b > y′, pir(0, ya) ≥ pir(0, y′) ≥ pir(x, ylb(y′)), retailer’s optimal deci-
sion is to order ya without guarantee. If ya/α < y′, for ya/α < b < y′,
pir(x,max{y′, ylb}) ≤ pipr (x, y′) ≤ pir(0, y′) |b=y′≤ pir(0, ya) |b=y′= pir(0, ya) |b∈(y/α,y′).
Define bu2 = min{y′, y/α}. By continuity there exists b2 ∈ (0, bu2) such that
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pir(x,max{y′, ylb(b)}) = pir(0,min{b, ya}). Also, for b > bu2 , the retailer’s optimal
decision is to order ya without guarantee.
For b < b1: ∂∂bpir(x, y
′) = 1 + rf − wE[ζ],
for b > b1: ∂∂bpir(x, ylb(b)) < 1 + rf − wE[ζ],
for b < ya: ∂∂bpir(0, b) = θ(pF¯ (b)−w)+α(1−θ)(pF¯ (bα)−w) > 1+rf−wE[ζ],
for ya < b < bu2 :
∂
∂bpir(0, y
a) = α(1 − θ)(pF¯ (bα) − w). Since bu2 ≤ y′,
α(1 − θ)(pF¯ (bα) − w) > α(1 − θ)(pF¯ (y′α) − w). Combing the fact that
pF¯ (ya) − w = 0, θ(pF¯ (y′) − w) + α(1 − θ)(pF¯ (y′α) − w) − 1 − rf + wE[ζ] = 0
and ya < y′, we have ∂∂bpir(0, y
a) > 1 + rf − wE[ζ] for b < bu2 . Therefore, b2 is
unique on (0, bu2).
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